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Abstract 
This paper uses a natural experiment to assess whether temporary protection from trade with 
industrial leaders can foster development of infant industries in follower countries. Using a new 
dataset compiled from primary sources, I find that in the short-run regions (départements) in the 
French Empire which became better protected from trade with the British for exogenous reasons 
during the Napoleonic Wars (1803-15) increased capacity in a new technology, mechanised cotton 
spinning, to a larger extent than regions which remained more exposed to trade. Temporary protection 
had long term effects. In particular, by exploiting the fact that the post-war location of the cotton 
industry was determined to a large extent by the historical accident of the wars, I first show that the 
location of cotton spinning within France was persistent, and firms located in regions with higher 
post-war spinning capacity were more productive 30 years later. Second, I find that after the 
restoration of peace, exports of cotton goods from France increased substantially, consistent with 
evolving comparative advantage in cottons. Third, I show that as late as 1850, France and Belgium - 
both part of the French Empire prior to 1815 - had larger cotton spinning industries than other 
Continental European countries which were not protected from British trade during the wars; this 
suggests that adoption of the new technology was far from inevitable. 
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“The principal advantage of the English cotton trade arises from our machines both
for spinning and printing (...). It is impossible to say how soon foreign countries may
obtain these machines, but even then, the experience we have in the use of them would
give us such an advantage that I should not fear the competition.” Joseph Smith and
Robert Peel, 17861
1 Introduction
A long-standing debate in economics is centred on the question of whether certain in-
dustries can benefit from temporary trade protection. The idea, widely known as the
infant industry argument, has a long tradition in the history of economic thought.2 In
recent decades, endogenous growth theory has identified a number of market imper-
fections which could inhibit entrepreneurs from entering high growth sectors at free
trade prices.3 In the case of a learning-by-doing production externality for example,
an economy which begins with an initial productivity lag with respect to the techno-
logical frontier can stay indefinitely stuck in low-growth sectors under free-trade prices
(Krugman 1987, Lucas 1998, Matsuyama 1992 and Young 1991).4 Under some condi-
tions, temporary trade protection can foster the development of high-growth sectors,
which, over time, can become competitive, though the effect on welfare is generally
ambiguous.5
Assessing the empirical relevance of these types of mechanisms has proven difficult.
The reason is that infant industry protection is generally granted by the policy-maker
at the specific request of the industry itself. This makes identification of the economic
mechanism at work challenging for two reasons. First, even if the industry becomes
competitive in the long-run, it is difficult to answer the question of whether the industry
would have become competitive anyway. The literature to date has tackled the issue by
1Edwards, (1967) p. 51.
2Early proponents include US founding father Alexander Hamilton, and the 19th century economist,
Friedrich List.
3Rodríguez-Clare (1995) and Rodrik (1996) present multiple-equilibria models with coordination
failures, Krugman (1987), Lucas (1988), Matsuyama (1992) and Young (1991) analyse models in which
the market imperfection is a learning-by-doing production externality. In Grossman and Helpman
(1991), the externality is in the R&D sector, while Aghion et al. (2012) have shown that sectoral
policy targeted at production in a particular sector can enhance growth and efficiency by forcing firms
to innovate vertically, instead of differentiating to escape competition.
4The mechanism works via a decreasing industry-wide cost curve which firms do not internalise.
When learning gains are external to firms, no agent internalises the fact that increasing production in
the present will move the entire industry down along its industry cost curve. Therefore, if one country
has a slight first-mover advantage, it will be further down its cost curve and firms in another country
will not have an incentive to enter the sector even if they could become more productive than the
country which is producing at present.
5In Section 4, I discuss the fact that in general, trade policy is not the most efficient way of correcting
the market imperfection.
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simulating the counterfactual (Baldwin and Krugman 1986, Head 1994, and Irwin 2000).
Second, in the case of a specific policy intervention, it is not possible to disentangle
the effect of the economic mechanism (measuring the existence and importance of the
market imperfection) from the efficacy of implementation, which is determined to a
large extent by the political-economy equilibrium. To the best of my knowledge, the
literature to date has not attempted to separate the two mechanisms.
In this paper, I present a natural experiment which replicates infant industry protec-
tion without the direct involvement of the policy maker, making it possible to address
both identification challenges. In particular, I study the spatial pattern of the adoption
of mechanised cotton spinning technology across regions of the French Empire during
and after the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815). Throughout these wars, the French Empire
was exposed to a regionally differential shock to the cost of trading with Britain. I use
variation in the size of the trade cost shock to identify the effect of trade protection on
mechanised spinning capacity during and after the period of increased trade protection.
The setting is ideal to examine the effect of temporary trade protection on tech-
nology adoption in an infant industry. Exogenous, within country variation in trade
protection makes it possible to compare outcomes in areas in which the cost of trading
with Britain increased to a larger extent, to areas in which the increase was smaller,
addressing the first empirical challenge. The fact that trade protection was not driven
directly by policy makes it possible to disentangle the economic from the political
mechanism, tackling the second empirical challenge. Finally, large disruptions to trade
usually affect both competition on the output side, and access to imported inputs,
making it difficult to disentangle the two effects.6 During the Napoleonic Wars how-
ever, access to the imported input, raw cotton, was affected fairly symmetrically across
regions of the French Empire, as the source country for this product was not Britain.
This allows me to focus on the effect of import competition on the output side, while
holding fixed access to imported inputs.7
The industry I examine is mechanised cotton spinning, as this sector had a number
of features which make it ideal for testing the empirical importance of the market
imperfections supposedly driving infant industry mechanisms. First, by the turn of the
19th century, Britain had gained a significant head start in the industry. The technology,
invented and developed in Britain in the late 18th century, was not adopted on a wide
scale across the Continent, which was particularly surprising in the case of France, as it
was Britain’s closest competitor. Slow adoption was all the more puzzling, as historical
6Amiti and Konings (2007) is a rare example of a paper which disentangles the effect of trade
liberalisation on imported inputs from import competition on the output side. Using detailed firm
level data on imported inputs for a panel of Indonesian firms, they show that access to imported
inputs increases firm productivity by at least twice as much as increases in import competition on the
output side.
7A number of recent papers show that access to imported inputs is an important channel for static
and dynamic gains from trade, particularly for developing countries. See Amiti and Konings (2007),
Goldberg et al. (2010) and Halpern et al. (2009) for developing and emerging economies, and Bøler
et al. (2014) for Norwegian firms.
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evidence shows that the technology was widely known and available to cotton (hand-)
spinners in France. Consistent with a static comparative disadvantage in cottons, by
the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars, French machine spun yarn was twice as expensive
as that spun in Britain, and France was a net importer of cotton goods. Learning-by-
doing externalities, an example of a market failure which can lead to infant industry
predictions, are argued to have been important in 19th century mechanised cotton
spinning (David 1970, Mokyr 2009).
The Napoleonic Wars led to a unique historical episode whereby blockade of Britain
was imposed in an unusual way. As Napoleon did not have the naval military power to
impose a standard blockade of the British Isles whereby the French navy would surround
British ports, he instead used his direct or indirect influence over much of Continental
Europe to attempt to stop British goods from entering the mainland. Ports were
closed to British trade, and the military was active in enforcing the blockade along the
coastline. In practice however, holes in the system opened up almost immediately, and
instead of achieving the original goal of stopping trade flows between Britain and the
Continent, the blockade displaced trade to more circuitous, and hence more expensive
routes.8
The key to my identification strategy is the uneven geographic success of the block-
ade. The blockade was generally effective in Northern Europe with exports from Britain
falling fivefold from peak to trough. Trade intended for Northern European markets
however, was diverted to Southern Europe. British exports to the region increased
threefold, as Napoleon’s inherent military weakness and the idiosyncratic political event
of the Spanish insurgency against Napoleonic rule meant that the blockade against
British trade was unsuccessful. The geographic asymmetry in the success of the block-
ade meant that trade flows to different parts of the French Empire were disrupted to a
different extent.
In the North of France, effective distance between a given region and London in-
creased markedly, as trade was diverted either to unreliable indirect routes through
German regions, or through Southern Europe. In the southern regions of France, effec-
tive distance to London changed to a far smaller extent, as trade routes stayed more or
less the same. Changing trade protection from Britain during the Napoleonic Wars was
thus driven by one of the best-documented empirical regularities in economics; the fact
that trade diminishes dramatically with distance.9 As distance is a barrier to trade,
it plays a role similar to that of tariffs or other trade policy instruments. Geographic
8In its use of a historical blockade as a source of exogenous variation, the paper is related to Hanlon
(2011) who uses the shock to US supplies of raw cotton during the American Civil War to test the
theory of directed technical change (Acemoglu, 2002). The author shows that as the British lost access
to US supplies of raw cotton, they increased innovation activity in the cotton sector in order to adapt
their machines to different quality cotton supplies. Another example of a historic blockade which has
been used as a source of exogenous variation is Irwin (2005) who examines the static welfare loss from
being shut out of world trade during the Jeffersonian embargo which took place simultaneously to the
Napoleonic Blockade.
9See Head and Mayer (2013) for a recent review of the gravity literature.
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distance however is constant over time, making it generally difficult to disentangle the
effect of distance from other regional characteristics fixed over time. My empirical strat-
egy exploits the fact that while geographic distance between Britain and French regions
did not change during the blockade, the set of possible trading routes did, leading to
changes in effective distance between London and a given French region.10
To conduct the empirical analysis, I collected firm- and regional-level data from
numerous primary sources on various aspects of the French economy during the first
half of the 19th century. Most importantly, I have assembled a panel database of
production capacity in mechanised spinning at the departmental level using detailed,
handwritten archival sources which provide data, in some cases at the firm level, for
mechanised cotton spinners. The dataset provides a unique look at a key industry at a
very early stage of industrial development for important areas of Western-Europe which
belonged to the French Empire.11
Second, to quantify how trade routes changed during the blockade, I extracted port
level shipping data from the Lloyd’s List, one of the oldest newspapers in the world.
Using a text matching algorithm, I have built a dataset of journeys between Britain and
Continental-European ports for a twenty year time period. Together, the two sources of
data make it possible to estimate the effect of trade protection on technology adoption
in mechanised cotton spinning.
The first part of the empirical strategy employs a difference in difference (DD) es-
timator with continuous treatment intensity. The strategy compares the size of mech-
anised cotton spinning capacity across regions which were exposed to smaller or larger
increases in the cost of trading with Britain (trade-cost shock for short), before and after
the Napoleonic Wars. Similarly to standard DD estimators, unobservables fixed at the
departmental level over time, and aggregate shocks which affect departments equally
are controlled for. Identification relies on there being no other shock contemporaneous
to, and correlated with the trade cost shock. As the shock itself varied smoothly across
the French Empire, the main challenge for identification is the question of whether
different regions of France had the potential to develop modern industry.
To address concerns regarding underlying characteristics which would have inevitably
rendered some locations more favourable for modern industrial production, I include
the time-varying effect of a number of variables which have been argued to be conducive
to the development of modern industry, and cotton spinning in particular. These vari-
ables include locational fundamentals important for mechanised cotton spinning such
10In this sense, the paper is related to recent contributions which use changes in trade routes or the
introduction of trade-cost reducing technology to estimate the effect of trade on growth in a cross-
country setting. See Feyrer (2009a), Feyrer (2009b) and Pascali (2014). Keller and Shiue (2008) use
the introduction of trains and trade liberalisation within Germany to show that trade-cost reducing
technology (trains) had a larger effect on market integration than institutional change (the abolishment
of the Zollverein).
11The data covers regions which include all of present day France, Belgium, Luxembourg, parts of
the Netherlands, the left-bank of the Rhine (part of present-day Germany), a part of Switzerland and
the North-West of present-day Italy.
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as access to fast-flowing streams and coal, the level of human capital, the size of the
downstream sector, urbanisation and population density, institutional change within
the French Empire and labour supply shocks. I show that while different regions of the
Empire did have somewhat different characteristics, regions were sufficiently similar to
expect that, given the same level of protection, modern cotton spinning could have
developed.
I find that areas which received a larger trade cost shock during the Napoleonic
Wars increased production capacity in mechanised cotton spinning to a larger extent
than areas which received a smaller shock. The estimated effect is large and statistically
significant. Moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the shock leads to a predicted
increase in spinning capacity which is similar in size to mean spinning capacity at the
end of the blockade. The results remain both statistically and economically significant
when the time-varying effect of the aforementioned potential confounders is added.
I find no similar effect in two closely related industries, woollen spinning and leather
tanning. Output in these industries was less intensively traded with Britain, and there
was no technological change in either industry, strengthening the results in cotton spin-
ning being driven by the trade cost shock. I also address the role of factor prices, which
has recently been put forward as an explanation for the slow adoption of mechanised
cotton spinning in France (Allen, 2009). Using data on the number of men conscripted
by Napoleon’s government, I find no evidence to support the theory that a negative
labour supply shock drove firms away from labour-intensive hand-spinning into capital-
intensive mechanised spinning during the Napoleonic Wars. Furthermore, different vin-
tages of machines were capital-intensive to a different degree, meaning that even within
mechanised spinning, firms could choose the degree of capital intensity. However, in
contrast to the predictions of an uneven factor-price shock across the French Empire
driving my results, I find that the trade cost shock had no impact on capital-labour
ratios across departments in mechanised spinning.
The fact that production capacity in mechanised spinning increased in regions which
were more affected by the trade cost shock is by no means obvious, as an alternative
technology (hand-spinning) was also available to producers. However, if an infant in-
dustry type mechanism was inhibiting French entrepreneurs from switching into the
new technology on a wide scale, we would expect not only that departments scaled up
in mechanised spinning capacity during the period of temporary protection, but also
that they became more productive over time. To answer this question, in the second
part of the empirical analysis I ask to what extent temporary trade protection had
long-term effects on the industry. I examine persistence in the location of the industry
within France, and ask whether regions with higher spinning capacity after the blockade
were more productive 30 years later. Both predictions emerge from an infant industry
mechanism. In general however, testing these types of predictions is difficult, as other
mechanisms, such as location fundamentals, would predict the same outcome.
The setting of the post-blockade cotton spinning industry provides a rare opportu-
nity to disentangle lock-in effects from locational fundamentals. To do so, I exploit the
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fact that the post-blockade location of the cotton industry was determined to a large
extent by the historical accident of the Napoleonic Wars. Using the trade cost shock as
an instrument for the post-blockade location of the cotton industry, I find that regions
with a higher level of spinning capacity at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, also had
higher capacity thirty years later. The estimated effect is large and significant. A one
standard deviation increase in the size of mechanised cotton spinning at the end of the
Napoleonic Wars leads to a 0.75 standard deviation predicted increase in the value of
production in 1840. Furthermore, areas with higher post-blockade production capacity
had more productive firms 30 years later. Again, the effect is large and significant. A
one standard deviation increase in spinning capacity per capita in 1812, leads to a 1.3
standard deviation predicted increase in productivity in 1840.
As tariffs were imposed on cotton goods between Britain and France following the
end of the Napoleonic Wars, the long-term within country results show that certain
French regions had become more productive and were able to withstand increased com-
petition after the Napoleonic Wars ended. It does not necessarily show however, that
(a subset of) firms had become competitive at free trade prices. For this reason, I also
examine exports of cotton goods from France. Consistent with evolving comparative
advantage in cottons, I find that exports of cotton goods increased substantially after
the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Finally, I examine whether convergence in cotton spin-
ning was widespread across the Continent. I find that as late as the mid-19th century,
France and Belgium, two parts of the French Empire which had benefited from a high
trade cost shock, had a larger cotton spinning sector than other Continental countries.
This fact suggests that adoption of the new technology was far from inevitable.
In what ways, if any, do the findings from this particular historical episode inform the
broader question of how openness to trade effects development? The most important
contribution of the paper is to show that the types of market imperfections which can
give rise to infant industry mechanisms appear to be empirically important, at least
in the context of early 19th century France. An interesting aspect of this episode is
the extent to which the setting seems general to the development experience of many
countries at the point in time in which a sizeable fraction of the labour force moves out
of agriculture and into unskilled labour-intensive textile manufacturing.
Differences between Britain and France were small prior to the invention of mech-
anised cotton spinning, at least relative to differences between rich and poor countries
today. Seen in this light, it would seem that the extent to which market failures could
inhibit economies from exploiting their underlying dynamic comparative advantage is
large.12 However, the fact that initial differences between late 18th century Britain and
France were relatively small may also suggest why I find large effects of a short episode
of extreme trade protection.
Many of the prerequisites for the development of mechanised spinning were in place
12Dynamic comparative advantage is a term which is often used to refer to sectors in which a country
does not have a comparative advantage at present, but in which it can develop one if the industry is
given temporary support. See Redding (1999) for a formal discussion.
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across large areas of the French Empire, meaning that once import competition was
sufficiently low, mechanisation was rapidly adopted. For example, the presence of down-
stream demand was important for the development of the industry. This suggests that
in cases where the underlying conditions are not in place, infant industry protection,
as implemented by the policy-maker, can turn out to be an extremely blunt tool.
The results of the paper contribute to several strands of the literature. First, the
main contribution of the paper is to evaluate the importance of the economic mechanism
underlying the infant industry mechanism in a well-identified setting. As noted, a
number of empirical challenges make the evaluation of infant industry promotion policy
difficult. Most studies use estimated model parameters to simulate the counterfactual
of no-protection.13 This approach implicitly evaluates both the underlying economic
mechanism – in general learning externalities – together with the efficacy of policy.
The papers generally find evidence of learning gains and productivity improvements,
and most studies find modest (positive or negative) effects on welfare. It should be
noted however, that all studies abstract from inter-industry spillovers, and as such they
constitute lower-bound estimate on welfare. The paper contributes to this literature
by examining a setting in which within-country variation in trade protection is driven
by exogenous events, providing a credible counterfactual for the regions which received
the most protection.
More generally, the economic theory underlying the infant industry mechanism can
be seen in the context of a large class of models which predict that industry location
is not uniquely determined by what is known in the new economic geography (NEG)
literature as locational fundamentals, and which would correspond in trade theory to
underlying (latent) comparative advantage. In particular, the paper is related to a
growing empirical literature which examines whether temporary shocks can perma-
nently shift the location of economic activity (Davis and Weinstein (2002), Redding et
al (2011), Kline and Moretti (2014)). In contrast to existing papers however, which are
motivated primarily by the predictions of NEG models, the focus of this study is not to
evaluate whether temporary shocks can shift the location of a given activity within a
country, but rather whether activity can be shifted across countries, in a context where
labour mobility is much smaller and the underlying mechanism is very different.
The paper is also linked to recent work which exploits firm-level data to exam-
ine the effect of trade on technology upgrading and productivity growth. In contrast
to the findings of this paper, Lileeva and Trefler (2010) and Bustos (2011) both find
that increased international competition induced firms to upgrade technology, albeit at
different regions of the productivity distribution. The mechanism in both cases is a
complementarity between exporting and technology.14 Both studies share the common
13Baldwin and Krugamn (1986 and 1988), Head (1994), Luzio and Greenstein (1995), Hansen,
Jensen, and Madsen (2003) and Irwin (2008).
14Exporting firms have access to a larger market, and for the most productive firms, this will justify
paying the fixed cost of exporting as in Melitz (2003). Paying the fixed cost of technology upgrading
will only be profitable for firms who have a large enough revenue, and these will be the exporting firms.
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feature that they examine trade liberalisation between countries at a similar level of
development. In contrast, the economic mechanism underlying infant industry protec-
tion assumes a technological gap which drives initial differences in static comparative
advantage for the sector in question. For this reason, it is more plausible to expect this
mechanism to be at work in the context of trade between countries at a different level
of development. The findings of this paper should thus be seen as complementing the
existing literature.
Finally, the paper contributes to the question of why mechanised cotton spinning
was relatively slow to diffuse to Continental Europe in general, and France in particular.
A large body of research in past decades has called into question Landes’ claim (1969)
that France was a backward economy held back by the incompetence and economic
mismanagement of the Bourbon regime (O’Brien and Keyder 1978, Crafts 1995 and
Horn 2006). Recently, Allen (2009) has documented factor price differences between
Britain and France, which may have made the adoption of capital-biased mechanised
spinning in high-wage Britain profitable, while adoption in relatively low-wage France
was not profitable. In contrast to these explanations, this paper finds support in favour
of an infant industry mechanism, and in this way, relates to Williamson’s (2011) work
on 19th century development.15
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, I discuss mechanisation
of cotton spinning and its effects on France. Section 3 discusses the way in which
the Napoleonic Wars drive exogenous changes in trade protection from Britain. In
the fourth section, I present a simple theoretical framework to guide the empirical
analysis. In this model, geography is the driver of trade protection and a learning-by-
doing externality is the market imperfection behind the infant industry mechanism. In
Section 5, I turn to the short-run empirical analysis, which is followed by the long term
results in Section 6. The final section concludes.
2 Mechanisation of cotton spinning in Britain and
its effect on France
In this section, I discuss the development of cotton spinning in Britain and France up
to the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars in 1803. I describe how the cotton industry in
the two countries was fairly similar until the invention of mechanised cotton spinning
Lileeva and Trefler (2010) introduce heterogeneity in the benefits of technology adoption to rationalise
their finding that less productive new exporters have faster productivity growth upon entry to the
export market than more productive new entrants.
15Learning-by-doing externalities, tariff protection and growth have been extensively debated in the
literature in relation to the cotton industry in the 19th century, particularly for the case of the US.
On this debate see Taussig (1931), David (1970), Harley (1992), Irwin and Temin (2001) for the US.
Crouzet (1964) discusses the effect that the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars had on infant
industries in Continental Europe.
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in Britain in the late 18th century. I then examine why mechanisation of one part
of the production process – spinning – had such a large impact on the industry. I
document the rapid diffusion of the technology across Britain, and show how despite
having knowledge of, and access to the new technology, mechanisation was not adopted
on a large scale in France up to 1803. I show that by this time, France had a marked
comparative disadvantage in mechanised spinning vis-a-vis Britain. Finally, I discuss
the reasons behind the predominantly local structure of the market, which turns out to
be important for discussing the short-run results.
2.1 Similar initial conditions in 18th century Britain and France
Britain’s absolute dominance of the 19th century cotton industry is a widely known fact.
It may thus be somewhat surprising that as late as the middle of the 18th century,
Britain and France both had a similarly modest sized cotton industry. It has been
estimated that about 3 million pounds of cotton yarn a year were spun in both Britain
and France, which compares modestly to Bengal’s 85 million pounds of yearly output
(Allen, 2009). The cotton industry was not only small in relation to world output, but
also relative to the size of other textiles in the domestic economy such as wool, linen,
hemp or silk.16
Why was cotton a relatively marginal sector in Continental Europe prior to in-
dustrialisation in Britain? In contrast to other textiles, cotton was not an indigenous
European textile.17 Asian cotton cloth was initially introduced to the European market
by merchants in the 17th century to enormous success.18 The boom in the consump-
tion of cotton cloth led to a fierce backlash from traditional textile industries in both
countries. To a certain extent, these vested interests were initially successful, as both
countries prohibited imports of Asian cloth for domestic consumption. Furthermore,
both countries banned the wearing of clothing made from cotton.19
However, two important loopholes to the general ban on cottons served as early
catalysts in the various stages of production. First, domestic cotton manufacturing
was tolerated. O’Brien et al. (1991) argue that the ban on imported Asian cloth was
instrumental to the foundation of domestic industry as it would have been difficult
for European producers to compete with Asian cloth both in price and in quality. As
cotton cloth produced domestically could not be sold in home markets, it was initially
16For example, Chabert (1949) estimates the size of the industries in 1788 and 1812 in France for
textiles as follows (in millions of francs); 1788: Linen and hemp: 235, Wool: 225, Silk: 130.8, Cotton:
no number given. 1812: Linen and hemp: 242.8, Wool: 315.1, Silk: 107.5, Cotton: 191.6.
17Strictly speaking, silk is not indigenous to Europe either, however silk production had been prac-
tised throughout Europe for centuries.
18Cotton’s immense popularity has been attributed to the fact that cotton printers were able to
make bright, lively coloured fabric with complex patterns, something which could not be done with
indigenous European textiles such as wool, linen or silk (Chapman and Chassagne, 1981).
19O’Brien et al. (1991) discuss the political economy of the cotton industry in both countries in the
decades leading up to the beginning of the mechanisation process.
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used to barter for African slaves (Allen, 2009).
Second, most important European port cities imported plain cotton cloth for print-
ing from Asia, as European spinners and weavers could not initially match the quality
of Asian cloth.20 Chapman and Chassagne (1981) document direct linkages between
involvement in cotton printing and the formation of backward linkages to cotton spin-
ning in both countries. Throughout the 18th century, both countries gradually relaxed
the constraints on domestic production and consumption. Thus, not only was the size
of cotton spinning similar in the two countries prior to mechanisation, but government
involvement in the sector had also followed a similar path.
2.2 Mechanisation in Britain
Based on these observations, up to the mid-eighteenth century, there was little dis-
tinction between Britain and France’s cotton industry. In both countries, the size of
the industry was marginal, and it was a sector not viewed particularly favourably by
the state. From these modest beginnings, it is hard to overstate the extent to which
the mechanisation of spinning (and later other stages of production) revolutionised the
cotton industry in Britain. According to Crafts’ (1985) calculations, cotton alone ac-
counted for an astonishing 25% of TFP growth in British industry between 1780 - 1860,
for 22% of British industrial value added, and 50% of British merchandise exports in
1831.
To understand why the mechanisation of one stage of production – cotton spinning
– had such a large effect on the industry, it is useful to examine the production process
in detail. First, raw cotton was an imported good for both France and Britain, which
were supplied by their respective colonies and the Levant.21
Upon arrival to Europe, the fibre was prepared - it was cleaned, carded and combed
into rovings. The second step involved spinning the rovings into yarn. Spinning was
usually performed by women in their own homes, generally as an additional source of
income during agricultural down-time. The third step entailed weaving the yarn into
cloth. This stage of the production process was also organised as domestic manufacture.
The type of cloth woven depended on the fineness of the the yarn (measured as its count)
and whether it was mixed with other fibres. Finally, the cloth was coloured and may
have also been printed with designs. Printing, because of its greater capital intensity,
was usually organised in small workshops.
A series of inventions mechanised the spinning of cotton yarn in Britain in the second
20This was true for hand-spinning, the only technology available at the time. The same was ini-
tially true for machine spun yarn, but as a result of continuous improvements in productivity, British
machine-spun yarn outcompeted the finest Indian yarn by the end of the Napoleonic Wars (Broadberry
and Gupta, 2006).
21French colonial supplies of raw cotton were abundant and of a high quality. In fact, Edwards
(1967) discusses the fact that as late as the 1780s, British spinners felt that their French counterparts
had an advantage in accessing good quality raw material.
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half of the 19th century. Traditionally, spinners had spun one thread at a time using a
simple wheel. Mechanisation increased output per worker as machines were able to spin
multiple rovings simultaneously. The relevant measure of production capacity in cotton
spinning became the spindle which is the piece of equipment onto which the roving is
twisted. A picture of the original spinning jenny invented by James Hargreaves in 1767
with sixteen spindles can be seen in Figure 1. This machine was relatively simple, small
and cheap.22
The water-frame and mule-jenny (the second and third generation machines), which
arrived in quick succession after the spinning jenny, were larger, more complex and more
expensive machines. They were better suited to spinning finer (higher count) yarns,
and from an early date they were powered by water (Edwards, 1967). The literature on
technology diffusion has documented a number of cases where the diffusion of technology
has been surprisingly slow.23 In the case of spinning machinery however, adoption
across Britain was remarkably fast (Allen, 2009). As we will see below, relatively fast
dispersion in Britain adds to the puzzle of why adoption across the Channel proceeded
slowly.
Mechanisation had large effects on the cotton industry for a number of reasons.
First, the machines disrupted the domestic structure of the industry. The size of the
machines, their complexity and their reliance on inanimate power rendered production
in the workers’ homes obsolete and manufacturing was soon organised in large factories.
Allen (2009) emphasises that part of the reason that cotton spinning proved to be so
revolutionary was that for the first time, production was organised not rurally, but
in large structures that required careful organisation of work-flow and management of
workers. Historical evidence points to the fact that experimentation via trial and error,
small improvements made by anonymous workers and entrepreneurs, and experience
acquired on the job were important sources of productivity improvements (Mokyr,
2009).
For example, Chapman (1970) finds that most cotton mills in England had a re-
markably similar structure. Chapman quotes a contemporary, Sir William Fairbairn,
on the reason for this striking similarity; “The machinery of the mills was driven by
four water-wheels erected by Mr Lowe of Nottingham. His work, heavy and clumsy as it
was, had in a certain way answered the purpose, and as cotton mills were then in their
infancy, he was the only person, qualified from experience, to undertake the construction
of the gearing.” (W. Pole (ed), 1877, quoted in Chapman (1970), my emphasis). Ed-
wards (1967) notes that when the mule-jenny (the third generation spinning machine)
“left Crompton’s [the inventor’s] hands it was a crude device, it had to be improved,
and the spinners and weavers of muslins had to acquire their skills.” (Edwards, 1967,
p. 4). As workers were mobile between firms, and machines and factories were initially
built by a handful of men as we have seen, small improvements in one firm could and
22Allen (2009) puts the cost of a jenny at 70 shillings (a spinner would earn a weekly wage of 8-10
shillings).
23See Geroski (2000) or Rosenberg (1981).
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did spill over to others.
Second, mechanisation had large effects for the productivity of spinning. The im-
provements in spinning technology are reflected in the price of yarn which declined
significantly during the period as is shown in Figure 3. The trend is most dramatic for
finer yarns, the real price of which dropped tenfold in as many years but there was also
a decline in lower count (less fine) yarns.
The improvement in technology in spinning had disruptive effects on other parts
of the production process. As mechanisation in weaving did not occur until well into
the 19th century, an imbalance in spinning output and weaving capacity soon made
British cotton yarn uniquely reliant on exports markets, of which Europe was by far
the most important. Crouzet (1987) estimates that around 56-76% of Britain’s cotton
output was exported either in the form of cloth or yarn.24 The largest market for
cotton yarn was Europe. 44% of cotton cloth and a full 86% percent of cotton yarn
exports were destined for the European market. In comparison, only 27% of woollens
and 8% of silks were destined for Europe. Crouzet notes that prior to the Blockade,
only France, Germany, Switzerland and Russia consumed cotton yarn. This reliance
on the export market for cottons in general, and the European market for cotton yarn
in particular, explains why maintaining trade with Europe in cottons was so crucially
important during the blockade, despite the risks and large increase in transport costs
that were involved.
2.3 Diffusion of technology to France
Mechanisation of cotton spinning in France proceeded very slowly relative to events
across the Channel. By the turn of the 19th century, France’s productivity gap vis-a-
vis Britain in cotton spinning was apparent. For many years, the conventional wisdom
in the literature was that slow adoption was a result of French “retardation” and tech-
nological backwardness. The incompetence and economic mismanagement of France
in the late 18th century has received much attention, as has Arthur Young’s often
repeated travel anecdotes of desperately poor, hungry and illiterate peasants across
France (Young, 1889). In recent decades however, careful comparative analysis of the
historical evidence, and systematic evaluation of the scarce statistics available in Britain
and France has given rise to a different interpretation of events. According to this liter-
ature, differences in Britain and France were far smaller than previously thought, and
both the state and cotton entrepreneurs played an active and helpful role in fostering
economic development in France.25
24As a comparison, 50% of woollens and under a third of silk was exported.
25Landes’ (1969) “Unbound Prometheus” is credited with being the most prominent exponent of
French backwardness, while O’Brien and Keyder (1978), and later Crafts (1995) questioned the validity
of this view. More recently, Horn (2006) and Squicciarini and Voigtländer (2014) discuss evidence of
state and entrepreneurial efforts to modernise the French economy in ways similar to that observed in
Britain.
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This more recent literature emphasises both indigenous innovation activity in tex-
tiles in France simultaneous to those taking place in Britain, and a widespread effort to
acquire British technology and best practice, once Britain’s lead had been established.
For example, McCloy (1952) notes that there were numerous inventions in textiles in
France throughout the 1700s, but predominantly in the last decades of the century. In
particular, “in the carding of cotton and wool a dozen inventions, real or alleged, were
made in the 1780’s and 1790’s”, while in spinning, “the French anticipated the spinning
jenny of James Hargreaves (1765) with two machines.” (pp. 90 - 91.). With respect
to the role of the government, Horn (2006) emphasises the importance that frequent
industrial exhibitions had in fostering innovation activity and disseminating technolog-
ical knowledge. For example, in 1800, the government invited submission for spinning
machines and rewarded the best ones.
Both entrepreneurs and the French government were well aware of the momentous
changes taking place across the Channel in the closing decades of the 18th century,
and the need for French entrepreneurs to follow suit if they were to remain competitive
in cottons. Importantly for my argument, the British prohibited both the export of
spinning machinery and the emmigration of engineers and skilled workers. This put an
artificial barrier on the diffusion of technology across the Channel. It meant that while
the French were able to acquire blueprints of the machines, and with the help of some
English and Irish engineers, British best practice, they didn’t have wide scale access to
the tacit type of knowledge that is acquired via learning-by-doing and that would be
embedded in the export of machines or workers.
Contrary to traditional accounts of government incompetence, Horn (2006) writes
that “the effort pivoted on acquiring English machines and spreading access to them
as widely as possible. As is well known, the French state concentrated on acquiring
Arkwright’s water frame and the mule-jenny, both of which were crucial to England’s
competitive edge. Industrial spies (...) were commissioned to acquire these technologies.
(...) British machine builders were rewarded for coming to France and given subsidies for
each set of machine they sold. The Bourbon government paid the wages of at least 100
foreign workers in machine building and provided large subsidies to innovative French
entrepreneurs who financed the construction of advanced textile machinery. Before
the adjudication of Arkwright’s second patent in 1785, no less than three mechanics
were building roller-spinning machines in France. Doggedly, if haphazardly, government
action enabled hundreds of English style (if not always functionally equivalent) carding
and spinning machines to be put into operation in nearly every major industrial district
in France between 1786-1789.” (p. 78).
However, it was not just the state which fostered technology diffusion. Chassagne
(1991) and Horn (2006) both emphasise that French cotton spinners played an even
more important role in the transfer of technology. In Toulouse, Francois Bernard
Boyer-Fonfrede recruited 12 engineers from Britain to build a six storey, water powered
spinning mill which employed over five-hundred workers. After construction of the mill
was complete, three were hired by a firm in Aix, and another by a firm in Gironde
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(Chassagne, 1991, p. 244). In Amiens, another entrepreneur, Jean-Baptiste Morgan,
was similarly active in fostering technology transfer. According to Horn, Morgan sent
agents to recruit English workers. “Arriving in yearly batches from 1788 to 1790, they
provided Morgan with a detailed and precise knowledge of English techniques, and with
the mechanical expertise to construct the needed machines and instruct workers in their
use.” (Horn, 2006, p. 83). Across France, entrepreneurs were engaged in similar forms
of technology transfer.
The French Revolution and the subsequent Revolutionary Wars (1793-1802) did not
put a stop to, but rather changed the nature of technology transfer. The French govern-
ment offered English prisoners of war skilled in textile manufacturing the opportunity
to work in France, which many took up (Chassagne, 1991). Horn (2006) notes that
English machinery continued to be acquired by such important Continental innovators
as Francois Bernard Boyer-Fonfrede (Toulouse) and Lieven Bauwens (Belgium).
What is striking about these accounts is the extent to which technology transfer
seems to have been reliant on British know-how. Furthermore, it also seems to be
the case that above and beyond the technological expertise required to build the mills
and machinery, French workers were also reliant on British training in acquiring best-
practice techniques in mechanised spinning and in training weavers to adapt to using
the new type of yarn. As we have seen above, this was not something unique to
French labour. Initially, British workers also experimented with and refined spinning
techniques in a similar way. The difference between the two countries however, was that
when French workers were experimenting and learning to spin with the new technology,
they were already facing a more experienced competitor across the Channel.
2.4 Puzzlingly slow adoption across France
The preceding discussion may give the impression that technology adoption was rapidly
advancing in France. According to all accounts, this was not the case. Despite both
state and entrepreneurial attempts to foster mechanisation of cotton spinning, France
lagged far behind Britain.26 In 1790, the number of spinning jennies was estimated
to be 900 in France, while the number in Britain has been put at 18,000 (Aspin and
Chapman, 1964). Similarly, Wadsworth and Mann (1931) found that while in Britain,
150 firms were using the water-frame, the number in France was four, and the mills
were all significantly smaller.
The literature has put forward a number of explanations for slow adoption across
Continental-Europe and in particular France, which is widely seen as Britain’s closest
competitor at the time. French institutional backwardness has traditionally played a
prominent role in explaining Britain’s primacy in terms of the timing of industrialisa-
tion. For example Landes (1979) claimed guild restrictions were particularly harmful for
entrepreneurial activity. This view is consistent with a recent literature which explains
26This was equally true for all of Continental Europe.
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Britain’s primacy in terms of its superior institutions (North and Weingast, (1989), Ace-
moglu and Robinson (2012)). Another strand of the literature has emphasised the role
of differing factor prices between Britain and France. According to this view, Britain
invented (capital-intensive) mechanised spinning because labour was relatively expen-
sive in Britain, while French entrepreneurs did not have an incentive to switch from
(labour-intensive) hand-spinning because labour was relatively cheap (Allen, 2009).
In contrast to these explanations, mechanised spinners active in France unambigu-
ously laid the finger of blame on British competition. Spinners from across the Empire
petitioned Napoleon to ban imports of all cotton cloth.27 According to their pleas, the
onslaught of competition was driving firms out of the market. French spinners were
not competitive in home markets despite the fact that throughout most of the period
in the lead-up to the Napoleonic Wars, trade between Britain and France was inhibited
by tariff and non-tariff trade barriers and as such, French firms were not competing at
international prices in home markets.
Comparing price data for machine spun yarn in Britain and France confirms the
competitive disadvantage of French spinners. Figure 4 compares Paris and London
prices for the full range of counts on the eve of the Blockade.28 The vertical axis shows
the price in francs, while the horizontal axis shows the count (finer yarns have higher
counts). The solid line shows the Paris price for different counts of French machine-spun
yarn, while the dashed line shows the London price for British spun yarn of exactly the
same count.
Two points are worth noting from Figure 4. First, not only were French spinners
out-competed in every count, but the gap becomes larger for higher counts. Consistent
with the evidence in Figure 3 which shows that mechanisation benefited higher count
yarns more, British advantage over the French was also higher in these counts. More
sophisticated, harder to imitate machinery such as Crompton’s mule was needed to spin
these finer type yarns. Second, French prices are not available for counts above 100,
as at this time, the French were not able to spin yarns of this finesse (Chassagne and
Chapman, 1981). This is further suggestive evidence of productivity gains acquired
through learning-by-doing. Machine spinning finer yarns was more difficult as with a
finer thread, breakages were more likely. Better quality (more even) machines and more
skilled workers necessary.
Consistent with comparative disadvantage in cottons, France was a net importer of
cotton goods at the beginning of the 19th century. In 1802-03, trade was relatively free
as peace had been momentarily restored to the Continent. In these years, imports of
cotton goods to France made up 8% - 12% of total imports.29 By way of comparison,
27AN/AFIV/1316 contains a petition from large spinners across the Empire requesting a complete
ban on English cloth, while AN/F12/533 contains a petition from the Chamber of Commerce in Rhone
(prefecture Lyon) requesting the same.
28Both prices refer to January 1807. Raw cotton prices are 6.9 and 5.4 francs in Britain and France
respectively. The source of these data is discussed in Appendix C.
29Data sources for French trade statistics are discussed in Appendix C.
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the respective numbers for linen and hemp were .7% and .6% respectively, while woollen
textiles were not listed as an import category.
The historical evidence paints a picture consistent with Britain acquiring a com-
parative advantage in cottons as a result of first-mover advantage in a sector with
learning externalities. As the empirical analysis focuses on within country variation,
a competing explanation of adoption which relies on uneven institutional change or
factor-price shocks has to rely on time-varying, within country differences, which are
arguably smaller than cross-country differences. Nonetheless, I return to the role that
alternative explanations may play in the empirical analysis, and show that the results
are robust to controlling for the time varying effect of institutional change and factor
price shocks.
2.5 Market structure of the cotton industry
In this section, I turn to examining the market structure of the cotton industry. Un-
derstanding the localised nature of the production process will aid the interpretation of
short run results. First, it should be noted that at the turn of the 19th century, cotton
yarn was produced using two technologies; traditional hand-spinning and mechanised
cotton spinning. The technologies appear to have produced imperfect substitutes, as
prices were quoted separately for the two products.
The market for yarn was predominantly local during the early stages of development.
The reasons for this are the generally small firm size in mechanised spinning, and the
rural structure of both hand-spinning and downstream weaving. As the downstream
sector did not mechanise until well into the 19th century, the organisation of production
remained rural.
These factors made establishing links farther away relatively expensive for most
spinning firms at this stage of development. Maintaining links with a large number
of small, downstream weavers was difficult at large distances for all but the largest
spinners. Though some firms did integrate spinning and weaving, most large firms
found it profitable to maintain the rural, putting out structure of weaving, and this
was to remain as such until well into the 19th century. These factors retained the local
structure of the market at the initial stages of development.
For example, one of the largest cotton cloth printers in the French Empire, Christoff
Philipp Oberkampf established a large cotton spinning enterprise to supply his printing
works which had been cut off from traditional supplies during the blockade. Even
with both the upstream and downstream of weaving integrated in one firm, Oberkampf
decided not to integrate weaving. " (...) it proved much easier to subcontract to rural
workshop masters, consigning to them boxes of mounted yarns and of barrelled wefts
every month. The masters were required to maintain exact accounts of the warps and
wefts received and were held responsible for all the pieces they produced that were
considered too lightly or badly woven. The supply of completed goods was ensured by
the mortgage of the masters’ property to Oberkampf.” (Chapman and Chassagne, 1991
17
p. 168).
With the exception of some large spinners, most firms sold their output at the
local marketplace or had a stable network of rural weavers to whom they gave the
yarn. A report from Seine Inferieure (prefecture Rouen) confirms that it was only
the small spinners who brought their goods to the market, while larger firms sold
the yarn themselves. Consistent with a predominantly local market, a report from
Dyle (prefecture Brussels) states that price differences in yarn across departments even
relatively close to each other were not exploited. The coexistence of hand-spinning
and mechanised spinning meant that increasing the supply of mechanised yarn did not
have to simultaneously lead to an increase in weaving capacity, as it could have just
substituted for hand-spun yarn.
Evidence on the market structure in the early days of mechanisation is in line with
evidence from Britain, which only began to export cotton yarn in 1794 which was
about two decades after the spinning jenny was invented. Edwards (1967) notes that
small spinners with limited capital often sold their yarn to larger spinning mills, which
saved them the cost of employing salesmen. Furthermore, receiving an advance in cash,
rovings or cotton ensured the continuation of production. He also documents direct links
between spinners and weavers. Employing middle-men such as yarn dealers who dealt
directly with weavers was expensive and, particularly for the more liquidity constrained
spinners, often infeasible as spinners had to wait 3 to 6 months before payment was
made.
This is not to say that all demand was local. Both Oberkampf and Lenoir, two
large spinners, had weavers working for them in numerous departments. Furthermore,
even during the Blockade, as the industry developed, larger firms began to look farther
away for profitable export opportunities. As early as 1808, spinners from northern
departments and the Haut-Rhin began to lobby the government to lift the ban on
exports of cotton yarn. In the south, the Chamber of Commerce in Rhone (prefecture
Lyon) worried that export markets in Russia and Germany would be disrupted by the
Blockade. For most firms however, the local market seems in to have been the main
outlet for production.
The market for raw cotton, the key input, was far more integrated by all accounts.
In Britain, dealers of raw cotton were initially not fully specialised, but rather they dealt
in many different colonial goods. As opposed to most spinners, they had substantial
capital (Edwards, 1967). Consistent with a more integrated market, the Journal du
Commerce regularly reported prices for different types of raw cotton from markets
across the French Empire together with the price for other colonial products, while
yarn was reported only sporadically and in far fewer locations. Different varieties of
cotton (Brazilian, Levantine, US and colonial) were generally available in all markets.
However, small and large firms differed in the way in which they accessed raw cotton
input. A report from Seine Inferieure describes how it was predominantly small firms
which were effected by the day to day movements in prices, which were to become
increasingly important in the uncertain years of the blockade, as bigger firms secured
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larger consignments of cotton directly from cotton dealers.30
Finally, given that local markets in cotton yarn were important, the location of
weaving is an important element of the analysis. As has been discussed, weaving was
to remain rural throughout our period of interest. Weavers worked mostly in their own
homes or in small workshops across the country, and mechanisation did not take place
until well into the 19th century. Panel C of Figure 14 shows the geographic dispersion
of weaving in 1803, where capacity is measured as the number of weaving frames per
capita by department. In the empirical analysis, I control for the time-varying effect
of downstream weaving, and show that the results are not being driven by spatially
uneven downstream demand.
3 The Napoleonic Wars as a Source of Exogenous
Variation
The rupture to trade and the resulting geographic variation in the extent to which
trading routes between Britain and the French Empire were affected provides a rare
opportunity to identify the effect of protection from competition with the industrial
leader on infant industry development in follower countries. In this section, I first
document the reasons which led to the unusual implementation of the blockade. I then
examine geographic variation in the effectiveness of the blockade using both port-level
data from the Lloyd’s List and data from British trade statistics. Finally, I describe
how goods made their way from smuggling ports into the French Empire.
3.1 Unusual implementation of the blockade
Napoleon’s Continental Blockade (1806-1813) took place within the context of the
Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815). It is within this historical setting that the motivations
and military constraints for both Britain and France can be understood.
Starting in 1803, a newly belligerent French Empire began its expansion on the
Continent to the increasing alarm of the British. These wars should be viewed as a
continuation of the French Revolutionary Wars which played out between France and
various coalitions led by Britain between 1793-1802. Between 1803 and 1815, as in the
previous decade, France fought Britain and its allies in a series of campaigns. Though
the threat of an actual invasion by the French never completely subsided, following the
defeat at Trafalgar in 1805, Napoleon more or less gave up on his plans of direct military
invasion of Britain. He instead turned his efforts increasingly towards defeating Britain
by economic means.
30For example, Chapman and Chassagne (1991) discuss Oberkampf’s efforts in securing Pernam-
bouco (Brazilian) cotton from Lisbon merchants by way of Nantes during the blockade.
19
The primary aim of the blockade was thus to weaken Britain economically by deny-
ing her access to important Continental European markets. However, the stark asym-
metry of naval power between Britain and France meant that traditional blockade of
British ports by the French navy was militarily infeasible, as Britain unambiguously
controlled the seas.31 In contrast however, Napoleon was increasingly successful in ex-
erting his direct or indirect influence over most of the Continent. In this way, though
Napoleon could not blockade British ports, he could use his land-based power to do
the next best thing, which was to attempt to stop British goods from entering the
Continent.
The political map of Europe in 1812 in Figure 2 shows the extent of the Emperor’s
power over the European continent. Though Napoleon’s power wasn’t quite so all-
prevailing in 1806, with the notable exception of Sweden, at one point or another all
other European powers passed laws in line with the aims of the blockade. By 1806,
the French Empire had expanded in size to include all regions of present-day Belgium,
parts of Holland, the entire left bank of the Rhine, regions of present-day Switzerland
up to and including Geneva, and regions in the North-West of the Italian peninsula, up
to Genoa.32 In addition, Napoleon’s relatives were on the thrones of the Kingdom of
Holland, the Kingdom of Italy, the Kingdom of Naples and the Kingdom of Spain. The
Portuguese royal family had fled to Brazil and Napoleon’s relatives were also in power
in key German states (Connelly, 1990).
Historically, when Britain and France were at war, direct trade between the two
countries collapsed, however the countries were able to continue trading with little
interruption by way of neutral carriers and nearby neutral ports.33 The period that
I examine here differs from other wars between Britain and France in the sense that
the entire Continent was affected. To understand the disruption to trade, it is worth
examining two periods separately; the three years leading up the imposition of the
Continental Blockade (1803-06), and the the blockade (1806-13) itself.
Disruption to trade along the North-Sea ports began in 1803 with the onset of
the Napoleonic Wars. “Neutral” ports along the North-Sea (Hamburg in particular),
together with Dutch ports had been traditionally used to continue trading with the
British in times of war. However, in a highly symbolic event, Hanover (the royal
dynasty to which monarchs of Great Britain belonged to) was occupied by the French
army. Britain retaliated by imposing a tight blockade of the entire North Sea coast
between the Weser and the Elbe, which was then expanded to include ports along the
French Channel and the North Sea in 1804 (Davis and Engerman, 2006). Crouzet (1987)
considers this period a prequel to the Blockade in the sense that trade to Northern
Europe was forced onto land routes for the first time significantly driving up the price
at which goods entered the Continent. Goods were taken from Britain to Altona and
31By 1800, the British had twice the number of warships as the French did (Davis and Engerman,
2006).
32The map of the French Empire relative to France at its 1789 borders can be seen in Figure 15.
33Figure 6 shows that this was the case during the French Revolutionary Wars (1793-1802).
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Tonning (both North of Hamburg). They were then smuggled into Hamburg and taken
into Northern Europe via land routes.
The Continental Blockade prohibiting the entry of British goods onto the European
Continent was declared in Berlin in late 1806 following the defeat of the Fourth Coalition
against France in Jena - Auerstadt. Prussia and Russia, two allies of the British, were
forced to implement the blockade along their coastline.34
The historical events that followed the introduction of the Berlin Decree are fairly
complex and they involve much back and forth retaliation between Britain and the
French, the details of which are not relevant for my purposes.35 The following points
are worth noting regarding the implementation of the blockade. First, the series of laws
passed by Britain and France had the effect of completely wiping out neutral shipping
on top of the evident damage they did to domestic shipping interests. Neutral carriers
such as the US found themselves in violation of one or the other powers’ decrees which
made capture by Britain or France almost inevitable. This had the effect of severely
increasing the costs and risks involved with sea-transportation and hence diverting a
large proportion of sea-borne trade onto more expensive land based routes.
Second, the extent to which Napoleon could ensure successful implementation of
the blockade depended on his ability to keep areas outside of France under his control.
Regions not directly under Napoleonic rule generally dragged their feet in implementa-
tion of the blockade because of the evident harm it did to merchant interests. Though
Napoleon was well aware of the hardships involved, defeating Britain enjoyed primacy
above all other considerations. Furthermore, the extent to which Napoleon could effec-
tively implement the blockade depended on his military commitments. The blockade
was enforced to a far greater extent during years in which Napoleon could commit more
troops to patrolling the coastline (Crouzet, 1987).
3.2 Geographic variation in the effectiveness of the blockade
Geographic variation in the effectiveness of the blockade was driven by the fact that
while the closure of ports was generally effective in Northern Europe, a number of
factors contributed to the blockade being ineffective in Southern Europe. This was the
case to such an extent that trade to this region actually increased markedly.
Figure 5 gives a snapshot overview of the intensity of trade with Britain at the
port level across Continental Europe in 1802, a year of relatively free trade and 1809,
a blockade year. These data are form the Lloyd’s List, and will be described in more
detail in Section 5. Each circle is proportionate to the number of ships sailing between
Britain and the given port. Comparison of 1802 and 1809 confirms that while the
34It is generally believed that the outline of the decree had been planned well in advance of the
British Orders in the Council which the French used as a pretext on the basis of which to retaliate.
The Orders in the Council, declared earlier in 1806, had widened the blockade already in place further
west to the home of the French Navy’s Atlantic fleet in Brest.
35The interested reader can consult Davis and Engerman (2006).
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blockade dramatically disrupted trade between Britain and the Continent, shipping did
not come to a standstill, but rather trade was diverted through a number of “smuggling
ports”.
To smuggle successfully, the British needed access to stable ports from which mer-
chants could conduct their business. To this end, they either used ports which they
directly controlled such as Gibraltar, Malta and Helgoland, or which were stably allied
to them, such as Gothenburg in Sweden. Figure 5 labels these four smuggling centres.
Napoleon’s inherent military strength in the North meant that the British had to re-
sort to smuggling via more difficult routes than in the South, where they had the upper
hand.
Furthermore, and perhaps most catastrophically, the Spanish insurgency against
French rule which started in 1808 meant that the entire Iberian peninsula became open
for trade with the British. Together with their control of Gibraltar and shipping on
the Mediterranean sea, Southern Europe became the main outlet for British goods,
and in particular cotton. French prefects in the south-western regions complained that
Spain was awash with British cotton goods which steadily made their way into France
through the Pyrenees. French consular reports described markets for British yarn in
Malta and Bosnia. With respect to the latter, the consul noted that there was no
domestic demand for yarn in Bosnia, instead it was purchased exclusively by Viennese
merchants for export.
Two features of the blockade are key to my empirical strategy. (1) The blockade was
for most parts well-enforced along the coast of the French Empire. (2) The blockade
was unevenly successful across Northern and Southern Europe. I now turn to examining
the reasons for these in more detail. Figure 6 shows time series evidence of the uneven
effects of the blockade. In each panel of Figure 6, the same port level shipping data used
to construct Figure 5 from the Lloyd’s List has been aggregated up to the regional level
in order to examine the evolution of shipping over time.36 Each line represents a given
region’s shipping with Britain as a share of total European shipping with Britain. Panel
A examines shipping to the Northern ports of Europe excluding ports that belonged
to the French Empire. Panel B examines shipping to Southern European ports, again
excluding ports which belonged to the French Empire, while Panel C examines shipping
along the coast of the French Empire.
3.3 Events in Northern Europe
Turning first to Panel A, Northern Europe is divided into three regions; the Baltic, the
North Sea and Scandinavia. From the onset of the French Revolutionary Wars in 1793
until the peace of Amiens in 1802, there was a clear upward trend along the North Sea
and Baltic reflecting substitution from French ports to these regions. The Napoleonic
Blockade differed from other trade wars between Britain and France exactly because
36I collected data for a wide time-frame starting in 1787 in order to confirm that the Napoleonic
Wars induced a rupture to trade different to previous episodes such as the French Revolutionary Wars.
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of the involvement of all European powers. Without neutral shipping to substitute for
the loss of direct trade between Britain and France (as was the case during the French
Revolutionary Wars), trade costs became significantly larger.
From 1803 onwards, the North-Sea could not be used to substitute for the loss of
direct shipping between Britain and France as it had been during the Revolutionary
Wars because of the British blockade of the coastline. Instead, much shipping was
diverted further East to the Baltic. Between 1803 and 1806, as shipping along the
North-Sea declined, the share of shipping to the Baltic picked up. Discussing the
effects of the North-Sea blockade on cotton exporters, Edwards writes; “During 1804
and 1805, when the Elbe was blockaded, Germany’s share of the total cotton exports
to Europe dwindled to a mere three percent, while there was a sharp jump in the trade
to Denmark and Prussia.” (1967, p. 55).
Accessibility of both the Baltic and the North-Sea worsened with the onset of the
Continental Blockade in 1806 (denoted by the second grey line) as Prussia and Russia
both implemented the blockade. Edwards (1967) notes that between December, 1806
and March, 1807 there was an almost complete standstill in trade to Northern Europe,
with insurance premia rising sharply. With the increasingly difficult situation in Ham-
burg, some cotton merchants relocated to Tonning and Altona. Their letters to Britain
were initially positive about the sales being made, noting that large quantities were
being smuggled successfully into France.
However, the blockade became even more severe from August, 1807. It was during
this time that Gothenburg became the important smuggling centre in the North, which
can be seen by the increase in shipping to Scandinavia until around 1808. Marzagalli
(1999) describes how merchants from Britain, Holland and Hamburg relocated their
business to Gothenburg to organise smuggling routes from this point. However, the
problem with Gothenburg was the lack of land connections to the German and French
regions, which were the final destination for most of these goods. Crouzet (1987)
describes how during a number of months in 1808 when the blockade was fully effective
both along the North-Sea and the Baltic, stocks piled up in Gothenburg as ships arriving
from Sweden were continuously denied entry.
It was possibly the increasingly difficult situation in the Baltic that encouraged
merchants to begin to lobby the British government for trading licenses to Helgoland.
This tiny island about 50 kilometres off the German coast, measuring only a couple
of square kilometres was taken by the British navy in 1807. The intent was to track
movements of the French army along the North Sea. The British government started
granting licenses to merchants to trade in Helgoland in late 1808, but smuggling began
in earnest in 1809. The increase in the share of shipping witnessed in the North-Sea
is accounted for single-handedly by this tiny island. Helgoland was more advantageous
as a smuggling centre for three reasons.
First, it was closer to the final destination of the German and French markets
reducing the land distances that goods would need to travel. Second, small fishing boats
could be used to smuggle goods onto alcoves and inlets on the North-Sea coast during the
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night (Crouzet, 1987), something that had not been possible from Gothenburg. Third,
the Baltic was only accessible by military convoy. To get to the Baltic, British ships
needed to cross narrow straits controlled by the Danish, who had become Britain’s
fiercest enemies as a result of Britain’s unprovoked bombardment of Copenhagen in
December, 1806.
Despite considerable efforts on behalf of both the British government and entrepreneurs
to find reliable routes via which to introduce their goods onto the mainland, northern
smuggling routes were extremely risky and precarious by virtue of the fact that for
both Helgoland and Gothenburg, there was no direct overland connection to Germany
and France. The trade via Helgoland in particular was reliant on diminished vigilance
along the German coast during Napoleon’s campaign against Austria. Kirkman Finlay,
a Glaswegian exporter of cottons noted that in 1810 “(...) the trade from Helgoland
was also destroyed, since the French emperor whenever peace was made with Austria
again closed up entirely every means of introduction from that island” (quoted in Ed-
wards, 1967 p.58). On the other hand, Gothenburg was reliant on Baltic ports granting
entry to ships obviously stocked with British cargo. Enforcement again fluctuated with
military events and Russia’s and Prussia’s shifting allegiances.
3.4 Events in Southern Europe
The situation in Southern Europe was completely different as is evident from Panel
B which shows the evolution of shipping for the Iberian Peninsula, the West- and
East- Mediterranean. First, it is important to highlight the Iberian peninsula’s key
importance in determining the fate of the blockade. From the onset of the blockade
in 1806, this region’s share of shipping increased dramatically. In fact, for two years,
60% of total European shipping with Britain was conducted via the Iberian-Peninsula.
Gibraltar carried a large proportion of this trade, as did Lisbon and Cadiz, both of
which were under British control from most of the blockade.
Even prior to the Spanish insurgency, with Gibraltar firmly in their possession, and
significant sway over much of Portugal, the British had access to a direct, overland
connection to France. Edwards notes that between 1805 and 1807 (prior to the Spanish
insurgency) cotton goods were exported in increasing quantities to Portugal, the Straits
of Gibraltar, Malta and Sicily in order to penetrate parts of France. The increase
in shipping on the West-Mediterranean was driven almost single-handedly by Malta.
Crouzet (1987) describes in detail the key importance played by Malta, especially in
the smuggling of cotton goods. At one point, 8.8% of exports from Britain were taken
into Europe via Malta.
Why was France’s military position weaker in Southern Europe? To begin with, the
French navy was in a desperate state on the Mediterranean as a result of an indiosyn-
cratic political event which took place during the French Revolution (Rogder, 2006).
As Jacobite power was unravelling in Paris, the city of Toulon on the Mediterranean,
home to the French navy’s Mediterranean fleet, declared revolt. As troops from Paris
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began to encircle the town, the Toulonnais called in the British navy. As a consequence
of the fighting, a significant part of the French fleet was destroyed or captured, an event
from which the French navy could not recover during Napoleon’s reign.
Furthermore, as a result a Napoleon’s misadventure in Egypt (interpreted in Britain
as an attempt to reach India), the British made control of the Mediterranean a policy
of strategic importance. They controlled a number of points of primary importance
in Southern Europe, such as Gibraltar and Malta, both of which became important
smuggling centres. Furthermore, they exerted significant influence on Portugal, a his-
torically important ally, but also Sardinia and Sicily. Finally, the British were also
directly involved militarily in the Spanish insurrection which began in 1808. Crouzet
(1987) describes how throughout the Napoleonic Wars, the British were able to single-
handedly control shipping in the Mediterranean, which he called a “British Sea”.
3.5 No direct shipping with France
Finally, Panel C shows the evolution of British shipping with the French Empire which
has been divided into three regions; ports along the French side of the Channel (includ-
ing Belgian ports), ports along the coast of the Atlantic and ports along the French
Mediterranean (including Italian ports which belonged to the French Empire). First, it
is clear that from the point of view of the French Empire, the Napoleonic Wars weren’t
particularly different from traditional trade war with Britain. The picture that emerges
for the French Revolutionary Wars (1793-1801) is basically the same as that which we
see during the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815). In both cases direct trade between the
two states collapsed as they went to war. As we have seen however, the difference in the
case of the Napoleonic Wars was that cheap (water-borne) indirect trade via neutral
ports was eliminated as a result of the trade war encompassing all of Europe.
3.6 Evidence from British trade statistics
Consistent with evidence form the Lloyd’s List, trade statistics for British exports of
manufactured goods and other British produce confirm the stark divergence between
trade to Northern and Southern Europe as Panel A in Figure 7 makes clear. Exports to
the Mediterranean increased threefold from the onset of the blockade to 1811, while ex-
ports to North-Western Europe (including France) were consistently lower. In fact, the
peak-to trough decrease in exports to these markets was five-fold. Furthermore, consis-
tent with the British using southern trading routes in years when northern smuggling
became particularly difficult, exports to the Mediterranean were lower when exports to
North-Western Europe were higher.
I also examine evidence on cotton exports in Panel B of Figure 7. Absent evidence
on exports of cotton goods by region, it is nonetheless important to assess the extent
to which cotton goods remained at all traded. If exports of cotton goods dramatically
decreased, it would call into question the extent to which regional variation in exposure
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to British trade was in fact taking place. Figure 7 shows that in fact, both cotton yarn
and cotton cloth continues to be exported.
Exports of cotton yarn were increasing prior to the onset of the Blockade, and they
initially declined to about a third of their value. In 1809 and 1810 however (during
the blockade), the value of exports was the same as in 1805. The pattern was similar
for exports of cotton cloth, though exports of cotton cloth were actually consistently
higher than in pre-blockade years. Unfortunately, these statistics are for total exports,
so it is not possible to rule out that part of the pattern was being driven by substitution
to export markets outside of Europe. However, two factors make this highly unlikely.
First, substitution to new markets was generally unsuccessful because of a lack
market information. Heckscher’s (1922) anecdote about ice-skates arriving in Buenos
Aires in December is one extreme example of this. Furthermore, cotton yarn was
particularly reliant on European markets by virtue of it being an intermediate good,
possibly explaining why cloth exports did not fall at all during the period, while yarn
exports did. Second, the peak export years in 1809-10 coincided with years where
enforcement of the blockade was generally lax, implying that European markets drove
the ups and downs for both cotton cloth and yarn during the blockade.
3.7 New trade routes into the French Empire
In the last part of this section, I examine how goods made their way from smuggling
centres into the French Empire. To answer this question I rely on historical accounts
on the routes which smuggled goods took. There is fairly widespread consensus among
historians of the blockade that one entry point for goods was Strasbourg. From the
North, once goods had made their way either into a Baltic port or a point of entry
along the North Sea, they were transported overland to Strasbourg. Ellis writes “ (...)
smuggling was more active along the inland than the maritime frontiers of the Empire.
One reason for this was the nature of the terrain (...). Another was the proximity
of foreign entrepots like Frankfrurt, Darmstadt, Mannheim, Heidelberg, Rastatt, Kehl
and above all Basel. Within the Empire itself there were many smuggling bases up
along the Swiss frontier and down the left-bank of the Rhine.” (Ellis, 1981, p. 203)37
Regarding Southern smuggling, historians agree that many of the goods taken by
the British to smuggling centres in the Mediterranean were destined for French and
German markets. There seems to have been a number of routes that goods took. First,
Livorno (part of the French Empire) seems to have been an important entry point for
37It may seem somewhat surprising that goods needed to be taken quite as far down south as
Strasbourg. Why weren’t they smuggled into the Empire via the Kingdom of Holland, a much shorter
route? The Kingdom of Holland proved to be far too permeable to the entry of British goods for
Napoleon’s liking. While increasing pressure was placed on his brother, Louis, the King of Holland,
to increase enforcement of the blockade, the decision was made to close the Franco - Dutch border
from 1808 effectively shutting off the potential entry of any smuggled British goods from the north
(Heckscher (1922) p. 181.) For this reason, British goods smuggled via the north took land routes all
the way to Strasbourg prior to entry into the Empire.
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smuggled goods (Marzagalli, 1999 and Galani, 2011). However, this likely changed with
annexation to the French Empire and both authors find that ships arriving from Malta
decreased significantly after this date.38 Second, there is also widespread consensus
that another favoured route was that taken via Trieste, consistent with the existence
of markets for cotton yarn in this region (Marzagalli, 1999, Crouzet, 1987). Heckscher
(1922) gives details of a smuggling route that began from Trieste and brought goods
up along the Danube into Germany and finally into France.
Finally, goods were smuggled into France from Spain via the Pyrenees. Archival
sources contain hundreds of letters between prefects in south-western departments and
the government in Paris. Based on these reports, the smugglers were well organised,
often being deserters of the army. Clashes between smugglers and the police result-
ing in casualties were not infrequent and the authorities were evidently outnumbered.
Similarly to the inland border in the east, the mountainous terrain provided smugglers
with a multitude of potential routes which made detection difficult. The Canal du Midi,
linking the Mediterranean to the Atlantic was supposedly riddled with smuggling cen-
tres. All border departments reported a multitude of routes with destinations ranging
from Bordeaux, Toulouse and Paris.39
One final piece of quantitative evidence from internal trade routes within the French
Empire confirms that with the onset of the Napoleonic Wars, the direction of trade with
Britain within France changed from a North-South route to a predominantly South-
North route. Figure 8 shows the time series for trade from Strasbourg up and down-river
along the Rhine. Coinciding with the onset of the Blockade, down-river trade (in the
south-north direction) increased dramatically, while up-river trade (in the north-south
direction) remained stable.
In summary, this section has shown that the unusual implementation of the blockade
led to geographic variation in the extent to which Northern and Southern trading routes
between Britain and Europe were affected. In Section 5, I describe how the change in
protection from British competition is measured using the data and historical evidence
which was described in this section. First however, I present a simple model to guide
the empirical analysis.
38For this reason, in quantifying the trade cost shock, I do not incorporate Livorno as an open trade
route during the Napoleonic Wars.
39One worry is that smuggling via the Iberian peninsula is overstated if the British also used the
Iberian peninsula as a point of access to markets in Latin-America. Crouzet (1987) discusses the
trade from Britain to Spanish and Portuguese colonies in detail. He finds that in fact, because of
the weakened state of the Spanish and Portuguese monarchy, the British actually had direct access
to these markets in contrast to the period before the blockade when British goods could only enter
the markets in Latin-America indirectly via either Spain and Portugal or smuggling via free-ports in
the Caribbean. This implies that if anything, comparing shipping between Britain and the Iberian
peninsula before and during the Blockade will understate the extent to which the peninsula was used
for smuggling.
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4 Theoretical Framework
This section develops a simple framework to guide the empirical analysis. In this model,
the presence of dynamic learning-by-doing externalities, combined with differences in
geographic distance to the frontier (Britain) play the key role in determining whether
regions are productive enough in the initial period to produce cotton yarn domestically.
Absent any shocks, initial specialisation determines how productivity evolves over time
as is standard in infant industry models. Learning-by-doing externalities have been
extensively discussed in the endogenous groth literature (Krugman 1987, Lucas 1988,
Young 1991, Redding 1999, Melitz 2007). Most closely related to the framework pre-
sented in this paper is Rodríguez-Clare (2007) who also studies the case of a small open
economy. The main difference in terms of other papers is the focus on geographic dis-
tance as a driver of protection across otherwise similar “industrial follower” economies.
Furthermore, I include an imported input necessary for the production of cotton yarn
to clarify the effect that a trade cost shock will have on the incentives for domestic
production when the price of both the imported output and imported input necessary
for domestic production increase.
4.1 Setup
The world consists of the frontier (Britain), F , and two follower regions i = 1, 2 (French
regions).40 F is sufficiently large relative to the combined size of the follower regions,
i, such that international prices are set at the frontier as if it were a closed economy.
Therefore, follower regions take international prices as exogenously given. The size
of the two regions, in terms of their labour force, is the same: Li = L¯. Labour is
not mobile across regions, but goods are traded across all three regions. There are
three tradeable goods; agriculture, A, cotton yarn, C, and raw cotton, R. Consumers
everywhere derive utility from the consumption of A and C, but not R. Raw cotton, R,
is needed as an input in the production process of yarn, C. All goods are perishable and
economies live in financial autarky. Consumers maximise the following instantaneous
utility function:41
U(A,C) = AαC(1−α) (1)
Goods around the world are produced using the following constant returns to scale
production technologies: Ai = LAi , Ri = aRi LRi and Ci = min{aCitLCi , R}. LAi , LRi
40The framework can be extended to accommodate an arbitrary number of follower regions, however
as the economies are allowed to trade with each other, this complicates the analysis significantly. Two
follower regions are sufficient to illustrate how initial differences in specialisation between the two can
lead to different long-term outcomes.
41In general, we only need to assume a utility function in which marginal utility becomes unbounded
as consumption of C approaches zero. I assume a specific functional form for utility to pin down
specialisation patterns if the two regions begin trading with each other at some t > 0.
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and LCi are labour employed in agriculture, production of raw cotton and cotton yarn
respectively. A and R use labour as the only input in the production process, while
producing one unit of cotton yarn requires one unit of raw cotton and 1
aCit
units of
labour.42 The i subscript refers to the region, while t denotes time.
International prices (set at the frontier) are straightforward. Choosing A as nu-
meraire, equilibrium prices given perfect competition, strictly positive final goods de-
mand for A and C, and intersectoral labour mobility are as follows: pR = 1
aRF
, pC =
1
aCF
+ aRF and wF = 1.
At t = 0, follower regions differ from each other only with respect to their geographic
distance to the frontier di. They differ from the frontier in two important respects.
First, they do not have the blueprint to produce R, which amounts to assuming that
aRi = 0.43 Second, they have an initial productivity disadvantage in C. In particular,
the evolution of aCit over time is given by the following equations
˙aCit
aCit
= Q(Ccit), ifaCit < aCF
˙aCit
aCit
= 0, ifaCit = aFC
(2)
where aCi0 = a¯C < aCF for i = 1, 2, Ccit ≡
∫ t
0 Cizdz, Q(Ccit) > 0.
Both follower regions start with an initial productivity lag in C relative to the fron-
tier.44 All follower regions have the potential to close the productivity gap via the
production externality. The learning function, Q, is strictly positive in cumulative pro-
duction but is otherwise unrestricted. I make three stark assumptions about the nature
of learning. (1) Productivity gains are fully external to the firm; no firm internalises the
effect that increasing production today will have on future labour productivity. (2) The
externality is spatially concentrated within the borders of the region. (3) Learning-by-
doing gains are bounded. At t = 0, firms at the frontier have exhausted all productivity
gains from learning-by-doing.
Follower regions take international prices as given, however, not all goods imported
from the frontier are available to consumers and firms at these prices. While A is
traded costlessly, both R and C face trade costs. In particular, if C is imported to
region i, there is a ti unit shipping cost, which is pure waste. The per unit trade cost
is a function of region i’s geographic distance to the frontier, ti = c(di), where di is
(geographic) distance to the frontier and c(di) is a function which is everywhere weakly
positive and increasing in distance. Shipping one unit of raw cotton, R, incurs a unit
shipping cost, τ , which does not depend on geographic distance to the frontier. The
42I assume a Leontieff-production function for C in R and L in order to highlight in the simplest
way possible the effect of an increase in the price of R on competitiveness of domestic production of
C. Results do not change qualitatively with positive, bounded substitutability between the inputs.
43I make this assumption so that R is an imported input for follower regions.
44I assume aFit = aFi ∀t, and for this reason I suppress time subscripts for the frontier. At the frontier,
the industry is no longer in its infancy as dynamic learning-by-doing gains have been fully exploited.
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fact that C’s shipping costs depend on distance, while R’s does not is motivated by the
fact that while Britain was the source for yarn, it was not the source for raw cotton.
Prior to the blockade both Britain and France had similar access to raw cotton, which
is why I take τ = 0 initially.45 Note however, that the results which follow do not rely
on any restriction on the size of τ relative to ti. Finally, if follower regions trade, they
face symmetric unit shipping costs on cotton yarn, t12 = t21.
4.2 Static Equilibrium
From the point of view of region i, firms only need to make a decision about whether
it is profitable to produce yarn domestically (and import the raw cotton needed for
production) or import it from the frontier. At t = 0, when aC10 = aC20, follower firms
will not be competitive in each others’ markets, as they are equally productive in C,
but face a non-zero transport cost. Note that A will always be produced as it is needed
either to pay for imports of raw cotton or cotton yarn.46
Given international prices as faced by agents in region i, we can easily solve for
specialisation patterns and equilibrium prices in i. Production of A and intersectoral
labour mobility will imply that wi0 = 1, i = 1, 2. Will region i produce cotton yarn, C,
or import it? This depends on whether firms can break even at prevailing prices. Firms
in region i will find it profitable to enter C at time 0 if 47
pC + ti ≥ 1
aCi0
+ pR (3)
Inspection of Equation 3 reveals that there will be a cutoff distance t¯ = a
C
F−aCi0
aCF a
C
i0
.48
Firms in regions with a trade cost ti ≥ t¯ will find it profitable to enter production of
cotton yarn, while regions with ti < t¯ will import yarn from the frontier.
Regions with ti ≥ t¯, will be incompletely specialised; they will produce agricultural
products and cotton yarn. They will export agricultural products in exchange for raw
45Different regions within France had somewhat different access to different types of raw cotton, as
I show in Section 6 because of non-negligible transport costs. This would imply that follower regions
have different transport costs of raw cotton τi, giving them a larger or smaller advantage in domestic
production of C. To the extent that differential access to raw cotton does not vary over time, they
will not affect the predictions of the model, or the empirical analysis as this effect will be subsumed
in the regional fixed-effects. For this reason, I simply take τ constant across regions.
46At first, it may seem surprising that yarn cannot be exported in exchange for raw cotton. However,
given that follower regions at their most productive can produce at pC when catch up is complete and
τ = 0, they can only sell in F at pC + ti; a price that is ti higher than the prevailing market price at
the frontier. The only exception to this is if the two follower regions trade with each other. In this
case, the region with a comparative advantage in C can be fully specialised, a possibility I explore in
the next subsection.
47The equation comes from the requirement that at price pC + ti domestic producers of C must
make weakly positive profits
48The expression for the cutoff distance substitutes for pC .
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cotton needed in yarn production. Prices are as follows: pAi = 1 and pCi = 1aCi0 + p
R ≤
pC + ti. Regions with ti < t¯, will be fully specialised in the production of A which they
will export in exchange for C. Prices are pAi = 1 and pCi = pC + ti.
4.3 Dynamic Equilibrium
Given the static equilibrium from the previous section, characterising the dynamic path
of follower economies is straightforward. Regions which began producing cotton yarn
at t = 0 will increase their productivity in this sector via the production externality
further strengthening their competitive edge in the domestic market until aCit = aCF
and catch up is complete. Regions which import yarn from the frontier at t = 0 will
continue to import yarn and aCit = aCi0, meaning that productivity will stagnate at the
initial level.
The dynamic path is slightly more complicated if one region begins producing C at
t = 0, while the other does not. Productivity in the region producing C may increase
sufficiently for the follower region to become competitive in exporting C to the follower
region specialised in A. In this case, the economy with a comparative advantage in
producing C will supply the other with cotton yarn in exchange for agriculture, while
both are supplied with R from the frontier. Depending on parameters, the following
outcomes are therefore possible:
1. If ti < t¯, i = 1, 2, both economies will specialise in the production of A and
import C.
˙aCit
aCit
= 0,∀t and pCit = pC + ti.
2. If ti ≥ t¯, i = 1, 2, both economies will be incompletely specialised in A and C
from t = 0 onwards.
˙aCit
aCit
> 0 and
˙pCit
pCit
< 0 while aCit < aCF . Once aCit = aCF , pCit = pC ,∀t.
3. If ti ≥ t¯ but tj < t¯ and pC + tj = 1aCiT + p
R + tij, for some t = T , then i will
be incompletely specialised in producing A and C and j will be fully specialised in
producing A and importing C from the frontier while t < T . However, once t ≥ T ,
i will be competitive at exporting yarn to j. This will change the direction of trade
and potentially alter specialisation patterns. Trade between the two regions will be as
follows: j will be fully specialised in producing A, which it exports to i in exchange for
C.49
4. If ti ≥ t¯ but tj < t¯ and pC + tj < 1aCit + p
R + tij,∀t, i will be incompletely
specialised in A and C and j will be fully specialised in producing A and importing C
49Depending on parameters, i can be completely or incompletely specialised in producing C. It
exports (or re-exports) A in exchange for R from the frontier. If pRaCit ≥ 1 − 2α, i is incompletely
specialised in A and C. However, for pRaCit < 1 − 2α, i is fully specialised in C. As technology
improves via the production externality, complete specialisation becomes more difficult. This is the
general equilibrium effect of C becoming cheaper. As C becomes cheaper, consumers in i and j increase
consumption of C, but this requires more imports of R, which in turn increases demand for A. Supply
of A can only be increased if i becomes incompletely specialised and this requires the wage to fall to
one, where production in A is once again profitable.
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from the frontier. Labour productivity in C in region i will never be high enough for
firms to become competitive in market j. This implies that i and j do not trade with
each other.
A number of points are worth noting in light of this result. First, initial specialisation
at t = 0 will determine whether a domestic cotton yarn production is able to develop in
a follower region i. This depends only on geographic distance to the frontier. Second,
cotton yarn production is an infant industry in all follower regions. With sufficiently
high temporary protection from trade with the frontier in the production of yarn (ie.
a sufficiently high ti), all follower economies can develop a domestic sector which is
competitive with the frontier at any distance. To see this, observe that once catch up is
complete, aCit = aCF , follower regions have the same labour productivity as the frontier.50
It should be noted that in general the extent to which temporary protection is
welfare improving depends on the speed of learning relative to discounting. If the
industry is not competitive at initial distance to the frontier, ti, consumers are worse
off during the time period where the cotton industry is protected, because they pay a
higher price for cotton yarn than they would if they were to import yarn at pC + ti, but
once the sector is competitive they are better off, as the price of cotton yarn decreases
below that of competing imported yarn. The net effect thus depends on whether the
long-term welfare gains outweigh the short term losses.
Finally, to the extent that one follower region is developing, while the other is not,
the time paths discussed in (3) and (4) differ only to the extent that under (3) the
developing economy integrates with the stagnating economy, while in (4) it does not.
The time path discussed in (3) will prevail if productivity gains in C outweigh the trade
cost tij between i and j. In particular, at t = 0, integration between i and j cannot
take place, because i and j have the same productivity, but i incurs the trade cost when
exporting to j. As i produces C, aCit increases and higher productivity can overcome the
trade cost. The possibility of integration between the two economies will be important
for understanding the long-term effects of temporary protection.
4.4 Understanding the trade cost shock
I now use this framework to guide thr empirical analysis. I allow for the trade cost
shock to effect both the costs of trading C and R.
In particular, let ∆ti ≡ t′i − ti denote the shock to trade costs for British yarn in
region i, where ti and t
′
i denote the trade costs between Britain and region i before and
50It is well known, that a tariff is not the most efficient way of fostering development of the infant
industry. In general, a production subsisdy which targets the industry with learning externalities is
more efficient than an import tariff, as it does not distort consumer prices. Melitz (2005) shows that
in settings in which a production subsidy is not feasible, an import quota may be more efficient than a
tariff. The reason for this is that if there are adjustment costs to changing the tariff, an import quota
– fixed at the long-run level of import demand for example – is less costly, as the effective tariff it is
equivalent to will decline over time as learning in the domestic sector increases.
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during the Napoleonic Wars respectively. Similarly, let ∆τi = τi denote the shock to
the price of raw cotton.
Domestic production of cotton yarn is profitable if the following condition holds
min{pC + t′i; pCjt + tij} ≥
1
aCit
+ pr + τi (4)
This expression differs from Equation 3, because the fact that the shock occurs at
t > 0 means that, given sufficient learning, follower regions could have been trading
with each other, making pCjt + tij the effective price at which domestic firms become
competitive in market i.
The effect of the change in trade costs depends on three forces. First, the increase in
the price of raw cotton will make all regions less competitive in yarn production relative
to the frontier. Second, a larger shock to the costs of trading in yarn makes domestic
producers more competitive. Third, if the region was previously producing yarn, then
aict > a
i
c0, meaning the region is, all else equal, more likely to remain competitive at
producing yarn despite the shock. I now examine the conditions under which regions
switch into and out of C.
1. Switching into C: A necessary condition for an economy i which was not pro-
ducing prior to the shock to switch into C is that ∆ti > ∆τi and 1aCjt + tij <
1
aCi0
.
The first condition is trivial, domestic production will only become profitable if
the shock to output prices outweighs the shock to input prices. Second, insomuch
as economy j was producing prior to the trade cost shock, the increase in produc-
tivity cannot have been large enough to outweigh the trade costs between the two
regions, otherwise j will continue to have a comparative advantage in producing
C as t12, the trade cost between the two follower regions, remains unchanged.
Sufficiency requires the difference between ∆ti and ∆τi to be large enough such
that the inequality in equation 3 is reversed.
2. Switching out of C: A necessary and sufficient condition for an economy which
was previously producing C to switch to importing C from the frontier is pC+t′j <
1
aCjt
+ pr + τi. Furthermore, any economy i out-competed by the frontier producer
in market i will also necessarily be out-competed in j because of the triangle
inequality.
How can this simple framework be used to guide empirical analysis? First, the model
makes clear that the price shock to raw cotton is a potential confounder. The previous
section has shown that the Napoleonic Wars led to an asymmetric shock to trade costs
for British yarn across the French Empire. The presence of an imported input necessary
for production implies that identification of the effect of protection on development in
mechanised cotton spinning relies on either observing both trade costs in each depart-
ment at all points in time, or in showing that the trade cost shock to imported raw
cotton was even across regions. In Section 6, I show the latter. In particular, while the
33
blockade against British trade had the spillover effect of making access to raw cotton
more costly, the effect of this was even across the French Empire, implying that time
fixed effects will capture the effect of more expensive inputs in the empirical specifica-
tion. In light of this, there are two predictions I will take to the data in the following
sections.
1. Short-run prediction: Changes in production of C should be positively related to
the size of the trade cost shock to British yarn.
2. Long-run prediction: Productivity increases in the level of local production.
The short-run prediction shows how time variation in geographic distance from the
technological frontier can be used to identify the immediate effect of trade protection
on infant industry development. In the interest of clarity, I have kept the framework
simple, however it should be noted that the short-run prediction should not trivially
hold in the data. One missing aspect of the analysis is the technology choice which
firms evidently faced in practice. As Saure (2007) shows in a theoretical model with
a choice of production technology, infant industry protection in developing countries
can fail to deliver on the hoped for dynamic gains if the profit-maximising technology
choice is different to that in developed economies.
In particular, the paper analyses a model in which firms face a technology choice,
with one technology featuring dynamic external returns to scale, while the other does
not. If the individually optimal technology choice for firms is the traditional one, then
protection will simply foster usage of the traditional technology without increasing pro-
ductivity. To understand the intuition in this specific framework as simply as possible,
imagine firms in follower regions have access to two technologies at t = 0; the one anal-
ysed above with learning externalities and initial labour productivity a¯C , and another
without dynamic externalities but with marginally smaller initial productivity a¯C + .
Faced with this choice, firms will choose the latter technology when trade costs are suf-
ficiently high to make domestic production profitable and once temporary protection is
lifted, they will return to importing yarn.
This simple example seems particularly relevant in this setting as French spinners
had access to both the traditional hand spinning technology and mechanised spinning.
As Allen (2009) argued, France had a lower wage to capital price ratio, implying that
the returns to adopting the more capital-intensive technology were arguably smaller
than for the British. Given the technology choice, observing adoption of mechanised
spinning systematically related to the trade cost shock is not trivial. If mechanisation
is not the profit-maximising technology choice, we would expect to see no effect of the
trade cost shock on this margin.
I take the long-run prediction of productivity increasing in the aggregate level of
local production to the data in two ways. First, I ask whether there was persistence in
the location of spinning activity within France, and second, I ask whether firms located
in regions with high post-blockade mechanised spinning activity were more productive
in the long-term than firms located in regions with a lower level of activity.
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The persistence prediction relies on regions which received a larger shock becoming
sufficiently competitive to survive competition with Britain under decreased trade costs
following 1815, which depends on the speed of learning. The prediction that firm
productivity increases in the level of activity at the regional level is a direct consequence
of the learning externality. In Sections 6 and 7, I take the short- and long-ru predictions
to the data. In the following section, I describe data collection and data sources.
5 Data
To answer the question of how the rupture to trade affected the development of mecha-
nised spinning within the French Empire during the Napoleonic Wars, I collected data
from various primary sources. The most important of these are handwritten prefectural
reports from the Archives Nationales in France used to construct the panel dataset of
mechanised spinning capacity examined in Section 2, and the Lloyd’s List, which is the
source for port level shipping data presented in Section 3. In this section, I provide
a brief overview of the most important sources and I describe construction of my two
measures of the trade cost shock. A more detailed description of all sources, construc-
tion of each dataset and potential limitations can be found in Appendix C. Examples
of the original data are provided in Figures 21 and 22 in Appendix D.
5.1 Data on mechanised cotton spinning
Napoleon’s government went to extraordinary efforts to collect detailed, systematic
data on many aspects of society and the economy during the Emperor’s rule. Data
from this period are of a very high quality, and they provide a unique opportunity to
examine development at an early period of structural transformation. Departmental
reports from the Archives Nationales provide systematic evidence on various stages of
the production process for the cotton industry. Remarkably, data for 1803 and 1806
are available at the firm level, while data for 1812 are available at the departmental
level.
Using these data, I constructed a panel of spinning capacity at the departmental
level. My preferred measure of spinning capacity is the number of mechanised spindles
in department i at time t (which is the relevant measure of physical capital), however I
show that the results are robust to using the number of workers employed in mechanised
spinning as the outcome variable. In the firm level dataset for 1803 and 1806, many
firms only report number of machines and not number of spindles. For these firms,
I have imputed the missing observations using a predictive mean matching model.51
Departmental spinning capacity for both 1803 and 1812 is observed for 88 departments
of the French Empire. These are the departments which make up my baseline sample.
51More details on the imputation model and robustness to imputation can be found in Appendix C.
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I also exploit the availability of firm level data for the initial period of the Napoleonic
Wars in the empirical analysis in order to examine baseline characteristics and the
margins of initial adjustment in the 1803-06 period.
5.2 Data on the trade cost shock
I use the Lloyd’s List, one of the oldest newspapers in the world, to reconstruct trade
routes between Britain and the Continent before and during the Napoleonic Wars.
The Lloyd’s List was, at the time , a bi-weekly newspaper for shipping news which,
amongst other things, printed the destination for all ships sailing from British ports,
and similarly, the source for all ships arriving to British ports. Early editions have
been digitised by Google and are made available by the Hathi Trust. I used an optimal
character recognition (OCR) programme to convert the images into machine-readable
format. This procedure converts the images into a text-file based on pattern recognition
of images which was manually set. By manually searching through editions, I compiled
a list of European port names. I then extracted British-Continental journeys using a
text-matching code which searched for the names of the listed European ports for all
years between 1787-1814. I found that the algorithm extracted about 70-80% of journeys
depending on the quality of the image for a given year, by checking the accuracy of
the algorithm for a subsample in each year. The number of mismatches was minimal,
and omissions (where the algorithm did not pick up a port that it should have) were
not systematic. I also had an entire year manually entered to check the accuracy of
the algorithm, which yielded very similar results. An observation is a journey between
Britain and a Continental European port i in year t. This period spans the full length
of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in order to show that the rupture
to trade during the Napoleonic Wars was radically different to a traditional trade war
between Britain and France – an example of which is the French Revolutionary Wars
(1793-1802).
The theoretical framework predicts that changes in mechanised spinning capacity
were driven by changes in the cost of trading with Britain. I construct two different
measures which account in different ways for changing trade costs during the Napoleonic
Wars and show that the results are similar when using both measures. The first mea-
sure is based on a shortest route algorithm which accounts for the extent to which trade
routes changed for each department. The second measure accounts for the fact that not
all smuggling routes were open at any given time during the blockade and some smug-
gling ports faced more severe capacity constraints than others. Instead of calculating a
shortest route, it weighs smuggling routes by the traffic which passes through them.
5.2.1 Measure 1: Shortest route algorithm
The first measure uses a shortest route algorithm to calculate the mean distance be-
tween London and each department. I account for one of the most important drivers
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of increasing trade costs; the difference between water- and land-borne routes, by cal-
ibrating the ratio of the two to match the fact that, during this period, sailing from
Rouen to Marseille was two-thirds of the cost of going overland when all trade costs are
accounted for (Daudin, 2010). Based on these numbers, 1 sea kilometre is equivalent
to about 0.15 kilometres on land.
To quantify the shortest route prior to the onset of the Napoleonic Wars, I allow
trade to go through any port that was in use between 1787-1814. To calculate the
shortest route between London and each department during the Napoleonic Wars, I
restrict possible routes to the ones which were in operation during the Napoleonic
Wars. These are the routes discussed in Section 3. In particular, Malta, Gibraltar,
Gothenburg and Helgoland are the main smuggling ports to which goods arrived from
London. To make it to France, these goods could either take the northern overland
smuggling route via Strasbourg, or a southern smuggling route via Trieste, Bilbao or
Barcelona. Trieste was a documented smuggling centre (Marzagalli, 1999 and Crouzet,
1987), while free shipping in Spain implied that water-borne routes could be used to
get goods close to the French border.52
For any department i, the algorithm then picks the least cost path. The trade cost
shock, defined as the log-change in the shortest route to London for each department,
can be seen in Figure 9, where darker shading shows a larger shock. As expected,
departments along the Channel have the highest trade cost shock. However, the shock
worked in a more complicated way than simply increasing in size from southern to
northern France. For example, departments along the Rhine witnessed almost no in-
crease in their effective distance to London by virtue of their proximity to Strasbourg,
the route via which goods entered the department. The routes that goods took prior
to the Napoleonic Wars were almost identical to the routes which they took during the
period 1803-1812. In contrast, the Atlantic seaboard witnessed a much larger increase
in trade costs, as these departments were initially easily accessible via sea-routes which
were not available during the blockade.
To what extent does this measure accurately capture the increase in trading costs
between Britain and a given department in France? One worry is that by excluding any
form of direct smuggling between Britain and France, we are introducing measurement
error. While it is certainly true that some direct smuggling between Britain and France
took place during the Napoleonic Wars, historians seem to agree that this was far
riskier than the indirect smuggling routes which I use to construct the measure of the
trade cost shock (Heckscher, 1922). The fact that third-country ports were used is
indicative of the fact that either direct smuggling was quantitatively unimportant as
the blockade was mostly effective along the coastline of the French Empire, or that the
risks associated with it were sufficiently high that taking more circuitous routes was
52Direct shipping between London and a number of ports in northern Spain also increased fairly sig-
nificantly suggesting that, at least for some years, routes cheaper than the London-Gibraltar-northern
Spain-France route were in operation. This implies that assuming goods came to the south-western
border of the French Empire via Malta or Gibraltar (from London) is a conservative estimate.
37
also profitable. In either case, this implies that my measure should do a relatively good
job of capturing the change in trade costs.
The second concern has to do with the fact that not all smuggling routes were open
at any given time. Furthermore, some ports (such as Helgoland) were more obviously
subject to capacity constraints than others (such as Malta). For this reason, I construct
another measure of the change in trading costs which relies on quantifying the extent
to which various ports were used for smuggling.
5.2.2 Measure 2: Weighted distance
An important source of measurement error when using the shortest route algorithm
to quantify the change in trade costs stems from the fact that it does not account
for capacity constraints and periods where smuggling centres were not open. As I
have shown, military events played a role in determining which areas of the European
Continent were more or less were open to trade and this variation had a time dimension
to it. For example, in years where the blockade in the north was almost perfectly
enforced, goods made their way into Continental Europe exclusively via the south. The
second measure therefore focuses on capturing the intensity of use of any smuggling
centre between 1803-12 instead of the shortest route approach.
To capture the intensity of port-usage, I use the Lloyd’s List to identify ports which
were intensively used during the Napoleonic Wars. I experimented with various defini-
tions to quantify smuggling at the port level, but the concentration of trade through a
small number of ports implies that the same ports played by far the most dominant role
in maintaining trade between Britain and Continent during the Napoleonic wars for any
sensibly defined measure. These are Cadiz, Gibraltar, Gothenburg, Helgoland, Lisbon,
Malta, and Tonningen.53 Given the pattern in Figure 5, it should not be surprising
that these ports played by far the most important role in smuggling British goods onto
the Continent. Depending on the precise method used for quantification, a number of
different ports enter the list, however their weight is always very small and as such,
should not influence the results in an important way.
The measure I use defines a smuggling centre as a port where the number of ships
sailing to or from Britain and the given port in any of the war years between 1803-1812
was greater than the amount of ships in any of the years before the onset of the wars for
which we have data (1787-1802). I use this condition in order to avoid mis-classifying
ports which happen to be open to trade with Britain but are not used as smuggling
centres. To focus on the quantitatively important smuggling centres, I further refine this
measure by using only the ports where the maximum yearly shipment in a blockade year
exceeds 80. The threshold is not particularly strict, as large and important smuggling
centres such as Malta have above 300 shipments in peak years.
Based on these conditions the following ports are classified as smuggling centres;
53Recall Tonningen played a crucial role in maintaining trade between Britain and the Continent
during the North-Sea blockade between 1803-1805.
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Cadiz, Corunna, Gothenburg, Gibraltar, Helgoland, Lisbon, Malta and Tonningen.54
The final step is to quantify the relative importance of each centre. I take total ship-
ments between 1803-1812, the years of the Napoleonic wars, and subtract total ship-
ments between 1793-1802. The difference between the two is a crude measure of smug-
gling. Weights are calculated based on a port’s share of total smuggling. According to
this measure, shipments to the southern smuggling ports accounted for roughly 70% of
total smuggling, which is similar to what differently defined measures give.
I proxy for the trade cost between London and a department prior to the Napoleonic
Wars by using Euclidean distance to London, while distance during the wars is given
as a weighted average of the Euclidean distance to each smuggling centre. Note that
by calculating distance in this way, I am being conservative in the sense that while
there is evidence for trade flowing in the south-north direction, (eg. from Malta to the
northern parts of Europe) there is no historical account of trade flowing in the north -
south direction (eg. from Helgoland to Southern Europe). This makes sense, seeing as
the binding supply constraint was in the North and not in the South. In this way, the
measure is probably overestimating the south’s shock relative to the north, stacking the
cards against finding an effect of trade protection on capacity.
5.3 Other data sources
To conduct robustness checks, data was collected from a variety of sources which are
discussed in more detail in Appendix C. Data on raw cotton prices were collected from
editions of the most important commercial newspaper of the time in France, the “Jour-
nal du Commerce” and they were supplemented with London prices from Tooke and
Newmarch (1848). To conduct falsification tests, I also collected data from handwritten
departmental reports on leather tanning and woollen spinning. To test robustness to
a number of potential confounders, I collected data from a variety of primary and sec-
ondary sources. Data on access to coal is from Fernihough and O’Rourke (2014), data
on mean stream flows for rivers across the French Empire is from the European Water
Archive, the historical location of the cotton industry is from Daudin (2010), literacy
rates are from Furet and Ozouf (1982), conscription rates are from Hagenvilliers (1937),
departmental population is from Chabert (1951), urban population is from Bairoch et
al. (1988), and population density is calculated by geo-coding a historical map of the
French-Empire in order to measure the area of each department. The long-term ef-
fects of the trade cost shock discussed in Section 7 are estimated using data on cotton
spinning firms from the first French industrial census (1839-47) which was collected by
Chanut et al. (2000).
54Corunna’s share in smuggling is below 2%.
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6 Short-term Empirical Strategy and Results
The theoretical framework presented in Section 4 predicts that a sufficiently large in-
crease in the distance to the technological frontier will result in departments switching
into domestic production in mechanised spinning. The exogenous variation in effective
distance to London provides us with a setting which we can use to take theory to the
data. To the extent that the mechanism is at work, we would expect increases in spin-
ning capacity during the period of the Napoleonic Wars to be systematically related
to the size of the trade cost shock. In this section, I first describe the evolution of
mechanised cotton spinning during the Napoleonic Wars and then turn to estimating
the short-run effect of trade protection.
6.1 Mechanised spinning during the Napoleonic Wars
Figure 11 shows the variation in spinning capacity which will be used to estimate the
effect of trade protection on increases in domestic production capacity. Panel A shows
the spatial distribution of spinning capacity across the French Empire in 1803, prior to
the onset of the Napoleonic Wars, while Panel B shows the same for 1812, towards the
end of the Blockade.
Between 1803 and 1812, spinning capacity in the French Empire increased by about
370%, from 380,000 to around 1.4 million spindles.55 As a comparison, it has been esti-
mated that Britain had around 6.8 million water and mule spindles in 1811 (Chapman,
1970). This should be taken as a lower bound estimate on total number of spindles as
it does not include older type machines such as spinning-jennies.
A look at Figure 11 reveals the differential impact of the Napoleonic Wars on mech-
anisation of cotton spinning across the French Empire. Particularly striking is the
increase in spinning capacity along the English Channel. By 1812, the two largest spin-
ning departments in the French Empire were Seine-Inferieure (prefecture Rouen) and
Nord (prefecture Lille), both along the English Channel. The enormous increase in spin-
ning capacity in the Nord from an almost irrelevant 2,700 spindles (contrast to Rhone
with more than 70,000 in 1803) to over 200,000 spindles is particularly impressive.
In general, the more Southern regions of the Empire stagnated during this time
period. The Rhone and Loire, two of the departments with the largest spinning capacity
in this region prior to 1803 showed varied performance. Spinning capacity in the Loire
decreased significantly (from 47,000 to 37,000 spindles), while the capacity in the Rhone
increased (from 72,000 to 96,000 spindles). However it is difficult to know what to make
of these latter numbers as spinners in the Rhone moved out from Lyon and back into
the surrounding countryside (which is where rural spinning was traditionally located),
which is the opposite of what we see in Seine-Inferieure and Nord where firms tended
to concentrate increasingly in Rouen and Lille. The South-West of the Empire along
55This figure is calculated using the 88 departments for which data is available in both 1803 and
1812.
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the border with Spain saw outright decline in all departments. Modern firms in these
areas went bankrupt and firms reverted back to hand-spinning.
The prefectural reports from various departments paint a picture consistent with the
numbers. Southern departments unanimously complained about a collapse in demand.
The prefect of Tarn (prefecture Albi) in the south-west described how the spinning
machines that were used in the department had not been in use for years and the
demand for all forms of cloth had collapsed. The prefect of Rhone (prefecture Lyon)
was even clearer in blaming foreign yarn for the collapse in demand.
The situation in the more Northern departments could not have been more different.
A report from the Nord (prefecture Lille) stated that there was not much change in
activity in linens, woollens and hemp. In contrast, he stated, trends in mechanised
cotton spinning were completely different. In this branch of the textile sector, despite
the high price of raw cotton, activity had picked up considerably, particularly during
1809 and 1810. Consistent with learning gains, the prefect also described how there
had been significant progress made since 1806 in the fineness of the yarn that they were
able to spin, claiming that they were now able to spin yarn as fine as 200 counts, which,
if true, was on par with the British.
It is worth bearing in mind, that the large increase in spinning came at a time
when the economic environment was highly uncertain and a number of factors specific
to the cotton industry made any form of development surprising. At the turn of the
19th century, France had already been at war for the best part of a decade and was
continuously at war during the period of interest. The country had recently emerged
from severe hyperinflation and general economic uncertainty was, and continued to
be pervasive. With respect to the cotton industry, in 1810, high import tariffs were
placed on raw cotton, the price of which was already much higher than in Britain.
Finally, cotton did not enjoy particularly favourable government support. The army
used exclusively woollen textiles (Grab, 2003) and Napoleon remained highly ambivalent
of developments in the cotton industry because of its reliance on imported inputs.
It is particularly interesting to note that cotton was the only textile to flourish
in the French Empire during the Napoleonic Wars, despite it being the only textile
singularly reliant on an imported input traded via sea-routes. For silks, woollens, linen
and hemp there was ample domestic supply of raw material and neighbouring countries
also produced significant quantities. This was not the case for cotton wool, and it
also explains why Napoleon was never fully supportive of the increase in the spinning
capacity in cotton spinning. Heckscher (1922, p. 272) notes “ (...) there was no point
where the two opposing tendencies of the Continental System were so much in conflict
with one another as here; and the reason was, of course, that the industry was based
on a raw material which was for the most part unobtainable by other means than by
the forbidden route across the seas.” On the one hand, increasing domestic production
in cotton meant a weakening of Britain’s economic advantage, however, the fact that
the industry was reliant on an imported input meant that the industry would always
remain reliant on sea-borne trade.
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This point should be taken into consideration when thinking both about the im-
portance of state support for the cotton industry. Heckscher recounts that Napoleon
was constantly trying to find substitutes for cotton. As early as 1809, he declared that
“it would be better to use only wool, flax and silk, the products of our own soil, and
to proscribe cotton forever on the Continent” (Heckscher, 1922 p. 277). In 1810, he
offered a prize of one million francs for the invention of a flax-spinning machine. Even
later, in 1811, when the cotton industry faced a severe crisis as a result of the high
tariffs put in place in 1810, he banished all cotton goods from the imperial palaces.
6.2 The short-run effect of trade protection
My empirical strategy is based on the well-documented fact that trade diminishes dra-
matically with distance, implying that geographic distance plays a role similar to that
of artificial barriers to trade such as tariffs.56 Geographic distance however is constant
over time, making it generally difficult to disentangle the effect of distance from other
regional characteristics fixed over time. My empirical strategy exploits the fact that
while geographic distance between Britain and French regions did not change during the
blockade, the set of possible trading routes did, leading to changes in effective distance
between London and a given French region. In this setting, the change in the direction
of trade between Britain and France changed effective distance between a given depart-
ment and London by changing the length of the journey which goods needed to take to
reach their final destination. The varying size of the shock to effective distance to Lon-
don measures the size of trade costs, which drives the variation that can be exploited
to estimate the effect of trade protection on mechanisation in spinning. This leads to
the following specification, similar in spirit to a standard difference-in-difference (DD)
estimator;
Sit = αi + δt + γlnDit + it (5)
Sit is a measure of mechanised spinning capacity in region i at time t, lnDit is a
measure of effective distance to Britain in department i at time t, αi controls for time-
invariant fixed effects at the regional level, and δt controls for the effect of aggregate
shocks over time. γ is the parameter of interest, which we expect to be positive if
effective distance to Britain is an important driver of mechanisation.
The unit of observation in the main analysis is the department, which I observe
in 1803, prior to the Napoleonic Wars, and in 1812, towards the end of the blockade.
There are 88 departments in the sample. Spinning capacity is measured as the number of
spindles per thousand inhabitants. Spindles is the standard measure of physical capital
in mechanised cotton spinning. The relationship is estimated in levels because of the
large number of zeros in the data. In Table 6, I show however that the results are robust
to using either a log-specification, or the Poisson conditional fixed effects estimator.
56See Head and Mayer (2013) for a recent discussion on the gravity literature.
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Spindles are normalised by departmental population to account for the fact that larger
departments may increase spinning capacity more in response to the same shock simply
because of their size. Effective distance to London in 1803 and 1812 is quantified using
the two different measures described in Section 5. Standard errors are clustered at the
department across all specifications to account for serial correlation. I also estimated
Conley’s (1999) spatially clustered standard errors. As these were generally smaller,
suggesting negative spatial correlation, I report the clustered standard errors across all
tables.
The estimation strategy compares outcomes in regions of the French Empire which
received a large trade cost shock to regions which received a smaller shock before and
after the disruption to trade. Differently to a standard DD strategy, treatment intensity
is continuous. Furthermore, the nature of the trade cost shock is such that all units
are affected to some extent by the disruption to trade. The latter is not problematic
for identification to the extent that the effect of interest is trade protection and not the
effect of the blockade itself. Put differently, we are interested in comparing outcomes in
mechanised cotton spinning across otherwise similar regions which received higher and
lower levels of trade protection. The period of the Napoleonic Wars provides a source
of exogenous variation in trading costs which allows us to identify the effect of trade
protection on mechanisation. The fact that the effective level of protection from trade
with Britain may not be the same as it was prior to the wars anywhere would be a
problem only if the effect we wanted to estimate was that of the blockade.
Similarly to a standard DD strategy, identification relies on there being no shocks
contemporaneous to and correlated with the trade cost shock. The main concern for
identification is that some areas of the French Empire may simply have been more
conducive to the new technology. If these variables were correlated with the trade cost
shock, and they exerted a time-varying effect on spinning capacity, my identification
strategy would be undermined. For this reason, before discussing the estimation results,
I begin by examining the extent to which “pre-treatment” firm and departmental level
variables differed across areas receiving a lower or higher cost-distance shock. Tables 1
and 2 divide firms and departments respectively into two groups depending on whether
they are above or below the median of the trade-cost shock (defined as the log change
in effective distance to London - measure 1). Figures 14 and 15 also show the spatial
variation for a number of these departmental level variables across the Empire.
Reassuringly, for the majority of variables, there is no statistically significant dif-
ference in means between the two groups. This is a stronger statement than what is
needed for identification in the DD setting, as – conditional on parallel trends – differ-
ences in levels do not undermine identification. It does however give us an idea of the
extent to which we can think of different regions of the Empire being comparable in
terms of their capacity to develop modern industry.
Conscription rates were higher for low trade cost shock departments (at 5%), and
population density was higher in high trade cost shock departments (at 5%). In terms of
the former, significantly higher conscription rates in low trade-cost shock departments
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are reassuring for our empirical strategy, as conscription rates are used to control for the
effect of a potentially uneven labour supply shock driving mechanisation. The fact that
it was the low-trade cost shock departments which had a higher negative labour supply
shock works against a factor price confounder driving the results. Population density
has been argued to be important for demand side explanations of industrialisation,
however, in the empirical analysis, I will control for the time-varying effect of population
density and show that results are robust to accounting for these differences.
Turning to firm-level differences, the only statistically significant difference between
high and low trade cost shock firms seems to be their age. In particular, high-trade
cost shock firms are significantly younger. I return to this issue when examining pre-
treatment trends and show that the difference is driven entirely by the time-varying
effect of population density, which we have seen is significantly different across the two
sub-samples.
Based on the point estimates, firms in low trade cost shock areas seem to have been
initially larger, both in term of capital and labour employed, but these differences are
not significant. To the extent that low-trade cost shock firms were initially bigger, they
seem to have been at an advantage both in terms of better access to raw cotton during
the volatile years of the Napoleonic Wars, and in terms of access to a larger market for
their output as a result of their size, which works against finding a positive effect on the
trade cost coefficient.57 Taken together, it seems that prior to the Napoleonic Wars,
different regions of the Empire were sufficiently similar to make a comparison between
them meaningful.
Table 3 contains the results from estimating equation 5 using both measures of the
trade cost. In both cases, the estimated effect of protection is large and statistically
significant. The point estimate of 33.11 in column (1), which uses measure 1 based on
the shortest route algorithm, implies that moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile
of the trade cost shock leads to a predicted increase in spinning capacity per capita
that is about the same size as mean spinning capacity in 1812 across departments.
To understand the source of identifying variation, Tables 4 and 5 present the results
from estimating a standard difference in difference specification using the median trade
cost shock to define the“large” and “small” trade cost shock groups for both measures
of the shock. “Large” and “small” in this setting, corresponds to the the treated and
untreated groups in a standard binary DD. For both measures of the trade cost, spinning
capacity increases in both groups between 1803 and 1812, but to a significantly larger
extent in the case of the high-trade cost shock group. Part of the variation is thus
coming from a crude North-South comparison.
Is there variation at a finer level in line with continuous treatment intensity? Columns
(2)-(3) and (5)-(6) in Table 3 show that indeed, treatment has a continuous effect, and
there is sizeable variation even within the North and South of France. Columns (2) and
(5) estimate the effect using only the sub-sample of above median latitude departments
using the two measures of the trade cost shock, while columns (3) and (6) do the same
57See Section 2 for a discussion.
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for the sub-sample of below median latitude departments. In three of the four columns,
the estimated effect is positive within the Northern and Southern subsample, and for
the Northern departments, both estimates are also statistically significant.
Taking these results together, the variation used to identify the effect of protection
on spinning capacity in columns (1) and (4) comes both from large differences in the
extent to which Northern and Southern departments scaled up production capacity,
but also from variation at a finer level of disaggregation. This strengthens the evidence
in favour of differential protection driving the results.
6.3 No similar effect on placebo industries
One concern may be that the results are driven by a contemporaneous shock which
effected different areas of the Empire differentially, such as a spatially uneven demand
shock. To strengthen evidence in favour of the trade cost shock driving the results,
Table 7 shows that the effect which I find for cotton spinning is not present for two
other industries, wool yarn (a direct substitute) and leather. Both products were less
intensively traded with Britain, and there was no technological change in either industry.
For these reasons, the shock should not have had a significant effect on the spatial
distribution of activity.
At the turn of the 19th century, both industries were still very much organised as ru-
ral, domestic manufacturing in contrast to mechanised cotton spinning. Mechanisation
had not been introduced in the woollen industry because of inherent differences in the
fibre which made mechanisation of wool spinning more difficult (Landes, 1969). For this
reason, in woollen spinning, the dependent variable is labour employed. As argued pre-
viously, wool was not an intensively traded good with the British, and the raw material
was also predominantly domestically supplied. Finally, it was an entrenched industry
which enjoyed a high level of state support. For example, the army used exclusively
woollen products (Bonin and Langlois, 1997). The caveat with using wool spinning is
that there may be spillovers from the cotton industry. It is conceivable that in the areas
where cotton spinning became widespread, wool spinning was squeezed out.
For this reason, I also collected data on the leather industry. Leather was similarly
rurally organised, with some military demand during the period and no significant
technological improvement. More than either woollens or cotton, it mostly served local
markets and used local supply. Access to water was the one locational constraint making
it an ideal industry with which to contrast cotton spinning (Bonin et Langlois, 1997).58
Table 7 contains the results from estimating the effect of the trade cost shock on
58There are three further considerations which should be taken into account when interpreting the
results. First, in the case of both industries, the pre-blockade data point comes from industrial surveys
carried out directly after the French Revolution in 1789. Second, in both cases, data from the pre-
Napoleonic period are generally worse quality simply because the questionnaires were more qualitative
in nature. Third, because in this case the first datapoint is from the 1790s (before France’s territorial
expansion), the sample is restricted to the territory of “ancien regime” France.
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capacity in tanning (number of pits), employment in woollen spinning, and, for com-
parability with the latter, employment in mechanised cotton spinning. The estimated
effects of the trade cost shock are not statistically different from zero for tanning and
woollen spinning, but are large and statistically significant for employment in mecha-
nised cotton spinning.
In the case of capacity in tanning, the positive point estimate is in fact non-
negligible. Moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the shock leads to a predicted
increase in tanning capacity that is equal to about 40% of the mean tanning capacity at
the end of the blockade. However, inspection of the scatterplot in Figure 12 shows that
two departments (Var and Ardennes) are extreme outliers. Dropping these leads to a
decrease in the point estimate from 0.28 (se 0.21 ) to 0.03 (se 0.11), which is basically
a zero effect.
Consistent with a negative spillover from cotton to woollen spinning, the point
estimates in Columns (3) and (4) are negative, albeit not significant. Moving from the
25th to the 75th percentile of the shock leads to a decrease in spinning employment that
is about 20% of mean employment in woollen spinning at the end of the blockade. The
point estimate is also less sensitive to outliers. Repeating the same exercise of dropping
the two largest outliers, the estimated coefficient decreases marginally in absolute value
from -2.23 (se 2.92) to -2.07 (se 2.01).
The estimated effect on mechanised cotton spinning is large and significant consis-
tent with previous results, though not quite as large as the effect estimated for capital.
Moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the shock leads to an increase in predicted
spinning capacity which is equal to about 75% of the mean employment in mechanised
spinning at the end of the blockade. The finding that the effect on employment is
smaller than the effect on capital (at least in terms of the point estimates) is plausible,
as capital should expand to a greater extent than labour at a time when increasingly
capital-intensive machines were being developed.59
6.4 Robustness to potential confounders
I now turn to addressing a number of important potential confounders. One important
concern is that of a potentially asymmetric shock to raw cotton prices on the input
side. Differently to cotton yarn, the source of raw cotton was not Britain, but other
countries.60 For this reason, imports of raw cotton were not resisted, and the French
attempted to secure access to raw cotton using the same trading routes as before the
blockade. The general difficulty of sea transportation meant however, that the trading
routes became more risky and hence more costly. This drove up the price of raw cotton,
but in a symmetric fashion across the Empire.
59If the two largest outliers are dropped, the estimated coefficient remains large and statistically
significant. The point estimate decreases from 0.93 (se 0.39) to 0.65 (se 0.29).
60In particular, the French used raw cotton from four sources; the Levant, Brazil (by way of Portugal),
the US and cotton from colonial sources.
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Figure 13 shows that for all four varieties of raw cotton in use across the French
Empire, prices increased markedly during the Napoleonic Wars, but the shock was
symmetric in the North and the South. In the case of Brazilian cotton, where one
specific variety (Pernambuco) can consistently be matched to London prices, it is also
clear that French prices increased to a greater extent than the British. All else equal,
this negatively affected French competitiveness, and explains why exports of cotton
goods did not increase until after the end of the Napoleonic Wars – a point to which I
return in the next section.
Departmental fixed effects capture all unobservables constant over time. In Table 8,
I show that the results are robust to controlling for the time-varying effect of a number
of variables which may plausibly effect the adoption of mechanised technology. Across
all columns, the coefficient of interest remains highly significant and relatively stable in
size.
In Columns (2) and (3), I examine the time varying effect of location fundamentals
such as access to fast-flowing streams and coal deposits. The literature has argued
that both these variables were important determinants of the location of the cotton
industry. Recently, Crafts and Wolf (2012) have found that in Britain, access to fast
flowing streams was a particularly important factor in Lancashire’s dominance of the
British cotton industry. In this setting, neither have a statistically significant effect,
more importantly the point estimate for effective distance is left virtually unchanged.
In the case of coal, the result is not particularly surprising, as steam-power only began
to play a more important role in cotton in later decades of the 19th century. Figure 14
shows that access to water power was available across various parts of France, and as
such, it may not have been a particularly important determinant for where the industry
would locate.
Column (4) controls for the time-varying effect of downstream weaving. Given the
importance of local markets at the early stages of development discussed in Section 2,
one worry is that mechanisation is simply being driven by demand from downstream
weaving. For this reason, I add weaving capacity in 1803 (normalised by population)
interacted with the time dummy, to control for the demand side of the market. As
expected, the coefficient is positive and significant, implying that for the same trade
cost shock, higher weaving capacity led to a larger predicted increase in mechanised
spinning capacity. The effect of the trade cost shock remains large and statistically
significant, though the point estimate decreases somewhat in size.
How should we think about the downstream result? It is clear from column (4)
that weaving mattered somewhat, but the results are not driven simply by the demand
side. This did not imply that increases in mechanised spinning had to lead to a propor-
tionate increase in downstream weaving. Recall that hand-spinning was still sizeable
in France at the time, and thus expansion in mechanisation did not have to lead to a
simultaneous expansion in weaving. This was the case even if all demand was local, as
smaller weaving centres which received a larger shock could have increased capacity in
mechanised spinning by replacing hand-spinning.
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Column (5) uses a slightly different measure of downstream demand, which encom-
passes all aspects of the production process for cotton cloth as of 1789. As such, it is
only available for France at its pre-revolutionary borders. This measure contains the
size of the hand-spinning of cotton yarn, and thus captures the extent to which prior
experience in hand-spinning was important for mechanisation. The estimated coeffi-
cient on the time varying effect of the historical location of cotton spinning is positive
and significant, but the size and significance of the effect of the trade cost is unchanged.
Columns (6) and (7) control for the time varying effects of population density and
urbanisation. Both measure the strength of agglomeration based explanations in de-
termining the location of mechanised spinning. Population density is indistinguishable
statistically from zero, while urbanisation enters with a positive and significant coef-
ficient. In both cases, the estimated effect of the trade cost shock remains large and
significant.
Column (8) explores robustness to adding a measure for human capital across de-
partments interacted with the time dummy. Human capital is measured as the pro-
portion of men able to sign their wedding certificates by department as reported in
Furet and Ozouf (1982). The estimated coefficient is large and highly significant, which
is somewhat surprising as other studies have struggled to find an important role for
human capital measured in this way, at the onset of industrialisation (Squicciarini and
Voigtländer, 2014). The coefficient of interest remains highly significant and the point
estimate increases somewhat in size.
In Column (9), I address a particularly important confounder - the role of factor price
shocks. In Section 2, I discussed the factor price hypothesis as one of two prominent
alternative explanations for the slow diffusion of spinning technology across France.
According to this hypothesis, labour was relatively expensive in Britain and cheap
in France rendering capital biased technological change profitable in the former, and
adoption of the new technology unprofitable in the latter (Allen, 2009).
Given this argument, an uneven factor price shock across the French Empire may
have rendered adoption of the new technology relatively more profitable in some regions
rather than others. During the Napoleonic Wars, conscription was consistently high,
and somewhat uneven across departments (Forrest, 1989). This is precisely the type
of negative labour supply shock which could drive up wages and push cotton spinners
into substituting expensive labour for cheaper capital. For this reason, I collected
statistics on conscription by department from Hargenvilliers (1937), and in Column (9),
I add a control for the time-varying effect of conscription rates in 1804-05. The point
estimate for the trade cost shock is virtually unchanged. The effect of conscription,
while statistically indistinguishable from zero, has the the expected positive sign.
As a further robustness check for factor price shocks, in Figure 16 in Appendix
B, I show that the shock does not differentially effect capital-labour ratios across de-
partments in a systematic way. More sophisticated machines with a larger number of
spindles substituted for relatively more labour, and thus an uneven factor price shock
across the French Empire should alter the capital-labour ratio at the departmental level
48
even within mechanised cotton spinning. Figure 16 shows that this is not the case. The
estimated elasticity is small, it has the wrong sign, and is not statistically significant
(point estimate -0.09, se 0.24).
In Column (10), I control for the time varying varying effect of institutional change
using the approach developed by Acemoglu et al. (2011). In their study, the authors
show that regions of Germany which received the institutional reforms of the French
either through annexation or conquest, grew faster throughout the 19th century. In my
setting, conquest by France meant annexation, and thus complete adoption of French in-
stitutions. For this reason, I use the date of annexation for each department, interacted
with the time indicator, to control for the effects of institutional change. Departments
belonging to France at the time of its 1789 borders are coded as receiving institutional
change in that year. The point estimate on the effect of the trade cost is left virtually
unchanged and remains highly significant, while institutional change enters with the
expected negative sign,61 but is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Finally, the
most demanding test for robustness of the effect of the trade cost is the simultaneous
inclusion of all time-varying controls. Column (11) shows that the estimated effect
remains similar in size when all controls are added.62
6.5 Adjustment on the extensive margin
If learning externalities are indeed important, we would expect a substantial proportion
of the expansion in spinning capacity to occur at the extensive margin. A large intensive
margin raises the issue that perhaps the results are being driven by effects internal to
the firm. Furthermore, if a couple of large firms are expanding in effected departments,
it is harder to argue that firms don’t internalise a substantial proportion of learning
gains. Exploiting the fact that firm level data is available for the initial period of the
Napoleonic Wars, in particular during the North Sea blockade (1803-1806), I examine
the extent to which adjustment to the shock occurred at the intensive and extensive
margin. In Table 9, I begin by estimating the effect of the trade cost shock at the
departmental level for the period 1803 - 1806 (Columns (1) and (4)). The effect is
large and statistically significant (point estimate: 7.96, se 2.24 - contrast this to point
estimate 33.11, se 9.78, estimated for 1803-12).
I take spinning capacity at the departmental level in 1806, and divide it into an
intensive and extensive margin by using firm level information on spinning capacity at
both points in time. I then estimate the effect of the trade cost shock on the extensive
and intensive margin separately. I find that the extensive margin is highly significant
61Being annexed to France at a later date, at least according to this view, is bad for mechanisation.
It should also be noted that the effect of institutional change cannot separately be identified from the
effect of incorporation into a larger internal market.
62In Column (11), I drop institutional change which is highly correlated with the time indicator.
The small sample size makes separate estimation of the two infeasible once other explanatory variables
are added. Results are robust to dropping the time indicator instead of the institutional variable.
49
and the attributed effect accounts for almost the entire combined effect (point estimate
6.84, se 1.81). In contrast, the effect on the intensive margin is small and statistically
indistinguishable from zero (point estimate 1.119, se 0.822). To the extent that this
pattern is representative for the full period, the evidence is strongly suggestive of the
fact that the driving force behind increasing capacity in mechanisation was not driven
by characteristics internal to firms alive in high-trade cost shock areas in 1803.
6.6 No differential investment in machine type
In Table 11, I use information on the type of machines in use in each department
to estimate whether the trade cost shock differentially affected the type of machines
firms used. The data allows me to differentiate between two types of machines “filatures
continus” and “mull-jennys”. The former were less modern machines, with fewer spindles
on average per machine, and they were mainly used for spinning less fine yarn. To the
extent that larger investments in the North during the Napoleonic Wars also entailed
upgrading into more modern and capital-intensive machinery, the long term results
which I find in the following section could be driven by investment decisions made
within the firm. To the contrary, I find that the trade cost shock had no differential
effect on the proportion of newer type machines in a given department.
6.7 No pre-treatment trends
Finally, I turn to addressing the question of differential pre-treatment trends. In the
absence of similar data for this period, I have constructed an approximation to spindles
in 1794 using firm level data from 1806. I take spinning capacity in 1803 for firms
alive in 1794 as an approximation to actual spinning capacity at the departmental level
in 1794, which I don’t observe. Of course, this assumes that all growth in spinning
capacity took place on the extensive margin and that firms didn’t go bankrupt, neither
of which are likely to hold. However, to the extent that results from the period 1803-06
are representative more generally, we should expect the extensive margin to be the main
channel of adjustment.
Table 10 contains the estimation results for the period 1794-1803, which I contrast
to the main results for 1803-12. The estimated coefficient for the period 1794-1803
without controls is small, positive and marginally significant at 10% (estimated coef-
ficient: 5.53, se: 3.054). The confidence intervals for 1794-1803 are non-overlapping.
More importantly, adding the same time-varying controls as in the previous section
changes the sign of the estimated coefficient, and it is no longer significant at con-
ventional levels. Population density seems to be the omitted variable which is driving
the result in column (1). As was shown earlier, population density was significantly
higher in high trade cost shock departments. Once the time-varying effect of popula-
tion density is controlled for, the trade cost has no statistically significant effect in the
pre-treatment period, while the effect is large and statistically significant for the period
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of the Napoleonic Wars.
6.8 Discussion
Taking all results together, though different regions of the French Empire were not iden-
tical prior to the Napoleonic Wars, they seem to have been sufficiently similar to expect
that all else equal, a number of different regions could have developed mechanised cot-
ton spinning on a large scale given sufficient protection from British competition. The
finding that increased trade protection led producers to scale up in the new technology
is by no means obvious. While it is true that a standard Ricardian-model without mar-
ket imperfections would also predict that short-run protection increases production in
the import-competing sector, the fact that two technologies were available for spinning
cotton yarn makes the short-run result interesting in its own right. To the extent that it
was factor price differences which rendered the adoption of mechanisation unprofitable
in France, all else equal, the trade cost shock should have had no effect on mecha-
nisation. The fact that it did, is the first piece of important evidence underpinning
an infant industry mechanism at work. In the next section, I examine the extent to
which temporary trade protection increased productivity in line with the prediction of
an infant industry mechanism.
7 Long-term Empirical Strategy and Results
The previous section established that the trade cost shock had a positive impact on
mechanised cotton spinning across the French Empire during the Napoleonic Wars. An
infant industry mechanism would predict that, given sufficient temporary protection,
the industry should survive competition at free trade prices once protection is removed.
When the blockade ended in 1813, the traditional North-South direction of trade be-
tween Britain and Continental Europe was restored. Trade between Britain and France
however was inhibited by high tariffs, making testing the competitiveness of cotton
spinning slightly more complicated.
On the one hand, imports of British cotton yarn had been prohibited prior to the
Napoleonic Wars, but as we saw in previous sections, the policy was highly ineffective
until the Napoleonic Wars drove up trade costs between the two countries. In this
regard, examining whether French spinners could survive competition at levels similar
to pre-Napoleonic War years would be evidence of productivity gains, but it would not
show that the industry had become competitive at free trade prices. For this reason, I
also examine exports of French cotton goods, as this tests competition between Britain
and France at international prices.
It is worth bearing in mind that aside from returning to pre-blockade levels of
competition across France, the post-war years were generally difficult for the cotton
industry. The dissolution of the French Empire proved tumultuous with fighting tak-
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ing place within the borders of France. Many spinning mills reported having to stop
production as a result of the invasion by foreign troops. The peace settlement restored
the borders of France to their 1789 levels, contracting the size of the internal market
for producers who remained within France.
7.1 Within country persistence and productivity outcomes
In this section, I examine long-term within country outcomes along two dimensions.
An infant industry mechanism would predict that productivity increases as a result of
temporary trade protection. If that is the case, then there should be persistence in the
location of activity. Furthermore, firm productivity should increase in post-blockade
spinning capacity.
Examining persistence in the location of spinning activity tests two somewhat dis-
tinct forces. First, for a sufficient increase in productivity, follower regions should
survive increased competition from the frontier. In this setting, this translates into
asking whether Northern regions which scaled up capacity during the wars were able to
survive increased competition from Britain after the blockade ended. Second, as was
shown in the theoretical framework, for a sufficient increase in productivity, follower
regions can integrate. If firms in Southern regions along the border with France went
bankrupt as a result of increased competition during the blockade, activity may not
return to pre-blockade levels of production once the blockade ends, if Northern regions
become sufficiently productive to compete in these markets. A return to pre-blockade
levels of production would weaken persistence.
Taking the two forces together, finding persistence according to this mechanism is
reliant on sufficient productivity increases. From an empirical point of view however,
the fact that other mechanisms also generate persistence and higher productivity in
areas with a larger concentration of activity makes identification a challenge in most
settings. In particular, firms tend to locate in areas which are conducive to a particular
type of activity. As locational fundamentals such as geography change slowly, if at all
over time, disentangling lock-in effects from these types of locational fundamentals is
an important empirical challenge.
The setting of the post-blockade cotton spinning industry provides a rare oppor-
tunity to disentangle the two effects. My identification strategy relies on the results
established in the previous section showing that the post-blockade location of mech-
anised cotton spinning was determined to a large extent by the historical accident of
the Napoleonic Wars. This provides a source of exogenous variation in the location of
cotton spinning which makes it possible to identify persistence resulting from lock-in
effects and productivity as a function of the scale of the industry.
To examine the effect of the post-blockade location and size of mechanised cotton
spinning on persistence and productivity, I estimate the following equation
Yi(j)t = α + βSi(t−1) + γ
′
x+ ηi(j)t (6)
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where Yi(j)t is the departmental (i) or firm level (ij) outcome in 1840, Si(t−1) is a
measure of the size of mechanised cotton spinning at the departmental level in 1812
and x is a vector of controls. We are interested in understanding whether the size of
cotton spinning activity at the departmental level and the productivity of firms in a
given department are affected by the post-blockade size of the industry. The worry is
that Sj(t−1) is correlated with unobservable that make some locations more attractive
than others. Instrumenting the size of the post-blockade cotton spinning sector with
the trade cost shock defined in the previous section solves the endogeneity problem as it
only uses variation in the size of spinning activity determined by the historical accident
of the Napoleonic Wars. Validity of the instrument relies on the trade cost shock being
uncorrelated with unobservables which affect the location of mechanised spinning and
firm productivity.
To take these predictions to the data, I use firm level observations on cotton spinning
firms from the first industrial census of French firms which was conducted in 1840.63 I
measure the productivity of the firm as the log of the value of output per employee. The
size of cotton spinning activity at the departmental level is measured by aggregating
the firm level value of output up to the departmental level. The size of mechanised
cotton spinning at the departmental level after the blockade is measured as the number
of spindles in the department in 1812. Both measures of the size of the industry
are normalised by departmental population to account for differences in the size of
departments.
Table 12 contains the results from estimating the persistence in the location of
cotton spinning. Both the OLS and 2SLS results point to a strong, positive effect of
the post-blockade size of cotton spinning activity on the size of cotton spinning 30 years
later. Columns (1) and (3) estimate the OLS and 2SLS effects using the specification
in equation 6 without controls, while columns (2) and (4) add a number of controls
measured at the departmental level. The estimated effects are large; a one standard
deviation increase in the size of mechanised cotton spinning in 1812 leads to a 0.75
standard deviation predicted increase in the value of production in 1840.
Columns (2) and (4) add controls for a number of other drivers of persistence.
In particular, I control for two potentially important sources of location fundamen-
tals for cotton spinning; access to coal and fast flowing streams, and agglomeration
effects measured using log-population density and urbanisation rates, each defined at
the departmental level. I also add a measure of human capital. All controls are mea-
sured at their pre-blockade level as contemporaneous values would arguably be bad
controls. Measurement error will attenuate the OLS estimates towards zero, while pos-
itive omitted variable bias from the endogeneity of locational choice will tend to bias
the OLS estimates upwards. The 2SLS estimate is smaller than the OLS estimate in
the specification estimated without departmental controls, while the opposite is true
when controls are added. This is accounted for by the effect of one observation (Haut-
Rhin) which, when dropped, gives 2SLS estimates which are consistently larger than
63Appendix C discusses this source in more detail.
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the corresponding OLS estimates.
Table 13 contains the results from estimating the effects of the size of spinning
capacity at the end of the blockade on firm productivity in mechanised cotton spinning
30 years later. Both the OLS and 2SLS results show that firms with larger spinning
capacity in 1812 have more productive firms 30 years down the line. Columns (1) and
(3) of Panel A contain the OLS and 2SLS estimates respectively using only firm level
controls, while Columns (2) and (4) add departmental controls. The estimated effect
is large and statistically significant, with the 2SLS estimates being larger in size than
the OLS estimates. The coefficient in column (4) implies that a one standard deviation
increase in spinning capacity per capita in 1812, leads to a 1.3 standard deviation
predicted increase in productivity in 1840.
The firm level controls are the size of the firm (proxied using the log of primary
materials used), the share of women and children in total labour employed and binary
indicators for whether the firm uses coal or water power. Departmental controls include
controls for urbanisation, log-population density and human capital.
Together, these results show that the trade cost shock had long term effects consis-
tent with the predictions of the theoretical framework that worked through the increase
in the size of spinning capacity. Despite having relatively similar conditions prior to
the Napoleonic Wars, regions of France diverged dramatically even after peace was
restored to the Continent. Consistent with learning externalities leading to location
lock-in, spinning activity in the South of France remained low despite the fact that
between 40% and 70% of French exports of cotton goods was destined for Mediter-
ranean markets after the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Proximity to export markets
arguably gave firms an incentive to locate in these regions, but it seems the forces of
an established industry in the North outweighed these benefits.
Given the tariffs in place on imports of cotton goods, one may wonder whether the
industry simply became sufficiently competitive to survive increased competition on
internal markets, but not necessarily competition at international prices. In the next
section I examine competitiveness at international prices using export data.
7.2 Competitiveness in export markets
In order to investigate whether some firms had become sufficiently productive to com-
pete at international prices, Figure 17 examines outcomes at international prices. Panel
A charts the evolution of the value of exports of cotton goods from France at constant
prices. The data are somewhat imperfect, as French trade statistics did not differenti-
ate between exports and re-exports until the mid-1820s and the classification of goods
often changes from one year to the next.
In Panel A, data is constructed conservatively with respect to the positive slope of
exports over time. Until the 1820s, French trade statistics did not differentiate between
exports and re-exports. Most exports prior to 1803 were likely to have been re-exports,
as France was a net importer of cotton goods at this time and not competitive in yarn.
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This will understate the increase in exports after the Napoleonic Wars, as I do not
include re-exports in my measure once they have been separated. Furthermore, I omit
exports to French colonies, as these regions were a protected market for French goods.
Exports of cotton goods increased sharply after the blockade ended in 1813, and
the upward trend continued well into the 1820s when my data ends. By 1828, 7.5% of
France’s exports were in cotton goods showing the increasing importance of the sector
in the French economy. As was the case at the end of the 18th century in Britain,
as the industry developed, cotton yarn itself began to be exported. For the French,
cotton yarn entered export statistics as a distinct category in 1822.64 Six years later,
the quantity exported had almost tripled.
It may be somewhat surprising that exports did not increase during the Napoleonic
wars as producers in the French Empire were scaling up production. There seem to be
two reasons for this. First, exports of cotton yarn were prohibited initially as result
of lobbying from the downstream sector. Second, high raw cotton prices within the
French Empire – a result of high trade costs and high import tariffs on the raw cotton
– rendered producers uncompetitive in export markets. Prefectural reports claim that
producers would be competitive in export markets if they had access to raw cotton
at the same price as the British. It seems that this was indeed the case, as exports
increased as soon as the blockade drew to a close in 1813 and raw cotton prices returned
to levels similar to those in Britain. The almost immediate increase in exports is all the
more striking as the period coincided with invasion by foreign troops and the dissolution
of the Empire. The first disrupted production, while the second led to prominent cotton
spinning regions, such as the Belgian departments, leaving the French Empire. Both
factors would tend to decrease export potential, while the decrease in trade costs as
the blockade ended would tend to promote exports to the extent that producers are
competitive at free trade prices.
Panel A thus shows that some firms had become competitive at international prices
during the years of the Napoleonic Wars. Panel B examines whether the dramatic
lowering of tariffs later in the century affected exports of cotton goods. Harrison and
Rodríguez-Clare (2009) argue that trade protection should have an asymmetric effect
on exports when infant industry mechanisms are at work. In particular, while the
imposition of tariffs should increase exports, the removal of tariffs should have no similar
effect on exports if the firms are competitive at free trade prices. Panel B shows that
this is indeed the case. The Cobden-Chevalier treaty, signed in 1860 by Britain and
France, dramatically decreased tariffs on all French imports, but this had no discernible
effect on French exports of cotton goods.
64The British first stated exporting yarn in 1794, by which time 8% of British exports were made
up of cotton goods. The French thus seem to have entered export markets in yarn when their cotton
industry was at a similar level of development.
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7.3 Cross-country comparison
Was the adoption of mechanised cotton spinning and the emergence of a competitive
cotton sector simply a matter of time for Continental countries? Figure 18 shows
evidence to the contrary. As late as 1851, there were two countries, France and Belgium
– both part of the French Empire up to 1815 – that had a higher level of cotton spinning
activity than other countries. Figure 18 follows the evolution of raw cotton usage
per capita for various Continental European countries between 1830-50. Raw cotton
measures the size of the industry as it is a raw input used solely in the production of
cotton yarn spinning.
The size of the industry across Europe in 1850, over 30 years after the end of the
blockade was much smaller in all other countries. Note in particular Sweden, Britain’s
most consistent ally throughout the Napoleonic Wars and a key smuggling centre for
British products, which had no cotton spinning to speak of, even in 1850. Note also
the time series for the Dutch, as well placed by their proximity to Britain as Belgium
and Northern-France to benefit from technology flows, but less well protected during
the Napoleonic Wars. The Dutch and Belgian regions were in fact one country between
1815-1830 giving them an even closer source of technology after 1815. With institutions
that rivalled Britain’s, they are as close to an ideal counterfactual as one could hope.
The fact that they have a very small cotton industry according to the data and in line
with other historical evidence (Mokyr, 1976), is strong evidence against the claim that
technological catch-up was inevitable.
Perhaps however France and Belgium were different to other Continental countries in
the sense that they had an underlying latent comparative advantage in cotton spinning,
while other countries specialised in other sectors. Evidence comparing early and late
industrialisers in Figure 19 suggests that in fact, developing a sizeable cotton spinning
sector was an event closely related to the timing of industrialisation in general. Panel A
reproduces Figure 18 for two early and two late industrialisers in Continental Europe;
Belgium and France, and Germany and the Netherlands. As can be seen, up to 1850,
Belgium and France had larger cotton spinning sectors than the other two countries.
At this time, industrialisation in the former was well under way, while it had not really
started in the latter group. By the end of the 19th century, when both Germany and
the Netherlands were industrialising, their cotton spinning sectors had overtaken that
of France and in the case of Germany, also that of Belgium. What this suggests is that
cotton spinning was an industry in which most countries specialised at an early stage of
structural transformation in much the same way as 20th century developing countries
initially specialised in unskilled labour intensive textile manufacturing before moving
into more sophisticated goods. The takeaway is not that cotton caused industrialisation
in different countries, but rather that cotton spinning was common to the process of
industrialisation across Western Europe. What this means is that it was not the case
that France specialised in cotton and Germany specialised in another equally important
textile rendering the cross-country comparison in raw-cotton usage meaningful.
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8 Conclusion
This paper has documented a sequence of events which suggests that in some set-
tings, temporary trade protection can foster growth in some industries. The preceding
analysis has shown that starting from a comparative disadvantage in cotton yarn spin-
ning vis-vis Britain, regions of the French Empire which became better protected from
trade with Britain during the Napoleonic Wars increased capacity in mechanised cot-
ton spinning to a larger extent than regions which received a smaller trade cost shock.
Consistent with infant industry models, the location of spinning activity showed strong
persistence over time, and regions which had higher post-blockade capacity in spinning
had more productive firms 30 years later. In line with competitiveness at international
prices, exports of cotton goods increased substantially, and by 1830, 7.5% of France’s
exports were in cotton goods. The results from this paper show that the infant-industry
mechanism highlighted by a class of models in endogenous growth theory (Krugman
1987, Lucas 1998, Matsuyama 1992 and Young 1991) can be empirically important.
What do the findings from this episode teach us about the effect of trade on de-
velopment more generally? An appealing aspect of this episode is the extent to which
it is general to the setting of structural transformation. For many of today’s devel-
oped countries, unskilled-labour intensive textile manufacturing was the first industry
into which labour flowed from agriculture at the early stages of industrialisation. The
findings of this paper suggest that market imperfections which drive infant industry
mechanisms may be at work in these types of settings.
This does not imply that trade policy will necessarily be an effective or desirable
tool when implemented by a policy-maker targeting specific sectors. One reason why
temporary protection may have had a large effect in France is that cotton yarn spinning
was a well-established industry with a sizeable downstream sector spread widely across
the Empire. Furthermore, many of the initial conditions which seem to be important
for modern manufacturing seem to have been in place across large parts of the country
prior to the Napoleonic Wars.
In the absence of these initial conditions, infant industry protection can turn out to
be a blunt tool. Recent evidence suggests that instead of “hard” interventions (Harrison
and Rodríguez-Clare, 2009) which distort prices to deal with market imperfections
such as trade policy, “soft” industrial policies which deal directly with the market
imperfection, while maintaining or increasing competition within a sector can increase
productivity (Aghion et al, 2012). However, this reasoning implicitly assumes that
policy-making is free from political capture, which, unfortunately, is not always the
case.
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Appendices
A Tables
Table 1: Pre-treatment comparison of firm level variables
Low trade cost shock High trade cost shock Difference N
Spindles 2444.24 1007.65 -1436.59 304
(1051.13) (280.37) (1087.87)
Employees 75.96 47.54 -28.42 296
(15.40) (14.65) (21.25)
Capital labour ratio 25.11 30.52 5.41 294
(4.50) (3.82) (5.90)
Age 9.04 4.71 -4.34** 303
(1.86) (0.63) (1.96)
Quality yarn 39.37 45.66 6.30 208
(4.18) (3.67) (5.56)
Proportion mule jenny 0.38 0.40 0.02 304
(0.13) (0.13) (0.18)
Notes: Low and high trade cost shock are defined at the departmental level. A department is assigned to
one or the other group depending on whether their trade cost shock is above or below the median. Spindles
and employees is the number of spindles and workers employed at the firm level, the capital to labour ratio
is calculated (in levels) as the ratio of the two former variables, quality of yarn spun gives the maximum
count yarn spun by the firm (quality and fineness of yarn increases in its count). The capital labour ratio has
less observations than both spindles and employees because two firms report zero workers, and for these, the
variable is undefined. The observations for quality of yarn is low, because Belgian departments report their
quality numbers according to a different scale and these are dropped. The proportion of mule jennys gives the
proportion of mule jennys (high quality) to other types of machines (lower quality). Robust standard errors
clustered at the department in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
63
Table 2: Pre-treatment comparison of departmental level variables
Low trade cost shock High trade cost shock Difference N
Spindles 11.67 9.95 -1.72 88
(5.87) (2.82) (6.51)
Weaving 1.43 4.07 2.64 88
(0.68) (1.81) (1.93)
Historical cotton 0.023 0.031 0.008 70
(0.007) (0.010) (0.013)
Access to coal 5.25 5.53 0.28 88
(0.15) (0.24) (0.28)
Access to streams 1.24 1.88 0.64 88
(0.19) (0.49) (0.53)
Literacy 0.42 0.47 0.05 63
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Conscription rate 1.51 1.33 -0.18** 86
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
Institutional change 1790.89 1790.43 -0.45 88
(0.71) (0.41) (0.82)
Urbanisation rate 0.07 0.08 0.01 66
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Population density 52.61 69.25 16.64** 88
(3.83) (5.94) (7.07)
Notes: Low and high trade cost shock are defined at the departmental level. A department
is assigned to one or the other group depending on whether their trade cost shock is above
or below the median. Departmental variables: Spindles and Weaving are the number of
spindles and weaving frames per thousand inhabitants; Historical cotton is a measure of
historical cotton spinning at the departmental level. It is the number of districts supplied
by the given department per thousand inhabitants in 1789. Access to coal is defined as the
log transformation of the inverse distance to the nearest coalfield; Access to fast-flowing
streams is defined as the (log) departmental average of mean water-flow rates; Literacy
rate is defined as the proportion of men able to sign their wedding certificate in 1786-
90; Conscription rate is the number of conscripts per thousand inhabitants in 1804-05;
Institutional change is measured as the date of incorporation into the French Empire;
Urbanisation is the share of population living in cities with more than 5000 inhabitants;
Population density is defined as inhabitants per square km. Further details on variables
and their definition can be found in Appendix C. Robust standard errors in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: Binary DD using the median trade cost shock
as a cutoff (measure 1)
Depvar Spindles Pre-war Post-war Difference
Large shock 9.95 51.73 41.78***
(2.82) (12.15) (10.42)
Small shock 11.67 18.92 7.25*
(5.87) (7.31) (3.62)
Difference -1.72 32.81** 34.53***
(6.51) (14.18) (11.00)
Notes: Dependent variable is spindles per thousand inhabi-
tants. The sample is split in two at the median trade cost shock
and this gives the definition for large and small trade cost shock.
Robust standard errors clustered at the departmental level in
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 5: DD using the median trade cost shock as a
cutoff (measure 2)
Depvar Spindles Pre-war Post-war Difference
Large shock 10.39 52.53 42.13***
(2.80) ( 12.17) (10.40)
Small shock 11.22 18.12 6.90*
(5.88) (7.35) ( 3.57)
Difference -0.83 34.40** 35.23***
(6.51) (14.14) (10.97)
Notes: Dependent variable is spindles per thousand inhabi-
tants. The sample is split in two at the median trade cost shock
and this gives the definition for large and small trade cost shock.
Robust standard errors clustered at the departmental level in
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Poisson fixed effects and OLS with log-specification
Trade cost measure 1 Trade cost measure 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DepVar Spindles Poisson OLS Poisson OLS
Trade cost (meas. 1) 0.495** 0.557***
(0.214) (0.189)
Trade cost (meas. 2) 1.039*** 1.220***
(0.319) (0.259)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Departmental FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 176 176 176 176
R-squared 0.254 0.323
Number of departments 88 88 88 88
Notes: Dependent variable in the Poisson fixed effects specification (Columns (1) and
(3)) is spindles per thousand inhabitants. In the log specification it is ln(1+spindles
per thousand inhabitants). Columns (1) - (2) use the shortest route algorithm to mea-
sure trade costs between London and the department (measure 1), Columns (3)-(4) use
weighted distance to measure the same. Robust standard errors clustered at the depart-
ment in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7: Falsification test using wool and leather
Tannery Wool spinning Mechanised cotton spinning
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DepVar Pits Pits Labour Labour Labour Labour
Trade cost (meas 1) 0.279 -2.228 0.930**
(0.215) (2.919) (0.390)
Trade cost (meas 2) 0.592 -4.85 1.880***
(0.420) (5.334) (0.608)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Departmental FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 122 122 152 152 176 176
R-squared 0.056 0.019 0.194 0.200 0.112 0.153
Number of dept 61 61 83 83 88 88
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1) - (2) is pits per thousand inhabitants employed in leather
tanning (measure of capital), in columns (3)-(4) it is workers employed in woollen spinning and in columns
(5)-(6) it is workers employed in mechanised cotton spinning. Column (1), (3) and (5) use the shortest
route algorithm to measure trade costs between London and the department (measure 1), Columns (2), (4)
and (6) use weighted distance to measure the same. Robust standard errors clustered at the department in
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 9: Extensive vs intensive margin of firm level adjustment 1803-06
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Spindles per thousand inhabs total ext int total ext int
Trade cost (measure 1) 7.962*** 6.843*** 1.119
(2.243) (1.815) (0.822)
Trade cost (measure 2) 14.08*** 11.87*** 2.207*
(3.398) (2.785) (1.286)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Departmental FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 204 204 204 204 204 204
R-squared 0.321 0.313 0.072 0.369 0.356 0.087
Number of dept 102 102 102 102 102 102
Notes: Dependent variable is spindles per thousand inhabitants. Columns (1)-(3) use the shortest route algorithm
to measure trade costs between London and the department (measure 1), Columns (4)-(6) use weighted distance
to measure the same. Columns (1) and (3) estimate the full effect of the trade cost shock shock for the period
1803-06. Columns (2) and (4) use only the extensive margin of firm adjustment, while columns (3) and (6) use
only the intensive margin. Robust standard errors clustered at the departmental level in parentheses, *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 10: Pre-treatment trends on the extensive margin
Pre-treatment: 1794-1803 Napoleonic Wars: 1803-1812
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DepVar Spindles
Trade cost 5.539* -0.372 -3.491 33.11*** 27.12*** 28.74***
(3.054) (3.625) (5.116) (9.775) (9.355) (8.654)
Streams -0.124 0.222 0.0379 -0.141
(0.436) (0.470) (0.0356) (0.146)
Coal -1.107 -1.829* -6.252 2.677
(1.131) (1.076) (3.905) (4.502)
Pop. density 17.96*** 18.20* 24.22 11.98
(5.786) (10.50) (14.70) (20.60)
Urbanisation -9.049 125.5
(21.35) (129.3)
Human cap. -2.028 55.92**
(6.055) (22.61)
Hist. cott. 64.29 499.9***
(47.46) (167.3)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Departmental FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 176 176 118 176 176 118
R-squared 0.181 0.328 0.270 0.337 0.374 0.641
Number of dept 88 88 59 88 88 59
Notes: Dependent variable in all columns is the number of spindles per thousand inhabitants. The
trade cost shock is measured as the log change in the shortest route between London and each
department (measure 1). Controls are defined as follows (all controls interacted with the post-
treatment time indicator); Streams: log of the mean stream-flow of rivers in the department (m3/s).
Coal: log-proximity to coal. Histcott: a measure of the size of the cotton industry in the department
in 1789. Pop density: log of inhabitants per square kilometre. Urbanisation: the share of population
living in cities with above 5000 inhabitants. Human capital: the proportion of men who are able to
sign their wedding certificate. For data sources see Appendix C. Robust standard errors clustered at
the departmental level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
71
Table 11: No differential effect on type of machine used by firms
(1) (2)
DepVar: Proportion MJ
Trade cost (measure 1) 0.0381
(0.0858)
Trade cost (measure 2) 0.0655
(0.133)
Time FE Yes Yes
Departmental FE Yes Yes
Observations 112 112
R-squared 0.083 0.084
Number of dept 56 56
Dependent variable is the proportion of mule jennies
used in the department as a ratio of all types of ma-
chines in use. Mule jennys spun finer, higher quality
yarn. Where the total number of machines in 1803 or
1812 was zero, and thus proportion is undefined, the
mean proportion of mule jennys in 1803 is used. Col-
umn (1) uses the shortest route algorithm to measure
trade costs between London and the department (mea-
sure 1), Column (2) uses weighted distance to measure
the same Robust standard errors clustered at the depart-
mental level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table 12: Persistence in the location of spinning activity, 1840
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Depvar Output 1840 Output 1840 Output 1840 Output 1840
Spindles 1812 113.6*** 92.46*** 96.68** 134.2***
(24.45) (26.89) (40.16) (41.98)
Departmental controls
Observations 74 68 74 68
R-squared 0.464 0.663
First Stage Reduced form
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Depvar Spind 1812 Spind 1812 Output 1840 Output 1840
Trade cost shock 0.0436*** 0.0284*** 4.212 3.805***
(0.0146) (0.0101) (2.600) (1.408)
Departmental Controls
Observations 74 68 74 68
KP F-stat 3.74 5.57
R-squared 0.220 0.379 0.074 0.348
Notes: Output 1840 is defined as the value of output in cotton spinning (in francs) in the department
per thousand inhabitants at the time of the first industrial census in France (1839-47). Spindles 1812 is
defined as the number of spindles per thousand inhabitants in 1812. Departmental controls: Access to
fast flowing streams, access to coal, literacy, urbanisation and log population density. The instrument is
the trade cost shock, measured as the log-change in effective distance to London during the Napoleonic
Wars (measure 1). Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 13: Productivity outcomes at the firm level, 1840
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Depvar Prod. 1840 Prod. 1840 Prod. 1840 Prod. 1840
Spindles 1812 0.580*** 0.425* 1.811** 3.847**
(0.204) (0.213) (0.746) (1.629)
Firm controls
Departmental controls
Observations 492 439 492 439
Number of departments 37 34 37 34
R-squared 0.190 0.288
First Stage Reduced form
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Depvar Spind 1812 Spind 1812 Prod 1840 Prod 1840
Trade cost shock 0.0850* 0.0589** 0.154*** 0.227***
(0.0440) (0.0249) (0.0320) (0.0552)
Firm controls
Departmental controls
Number of departments 37 34 37 34
Observations 492 439 492 439
KP F-stat 8.85 7.86
R-squared 0.266 0.686 0.234 0.320
Notes: Prod. 1840 is defined as the log of the value of production per employee. The top
and bottom 1% of the productivity distribution has been trimmed. Spindles 1812 is defined as
the number of spindles in 1812 per thousand inhabitants at the departmental level. Firm level
controls: share of women and children employed in the firm (separately), binary indicators for
whether the firm uses steam or water-power, firm size proxied by the log of the value of primary
materials. Departmental controls: literacy, urbanisation rate and log population density. The
instrument is the trade cost shock, measured as the log-change in effective distance to London
during the Napoleonic Wars (measure 1). Robust standard errors clustered at the departmental
level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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B Figures
Figure 1: An early spinning jenny
Source: Engraving by T. E. Nicholson (1835)
Figure 2: Political map of Europe, 1812
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Figure 3: Real price of yarn in Britain, Harley (1998)
Real price of cotton yarn in Britain. Mechanisation decreased price of finer (higher count) yarns
disproportionately. For data sources see Harley (1998).
Figure 4: Price of different count cotton yarn in Paris and London, 1806-07
Price of machine-spun cotton yarn in Britain and France in francs by count. Finer yarn has higher
count. See Appendix C for details on sources.
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(a) Port usage, 1802
(b) Port usage, 1809
Figure 5: Intensity of port use in trade with the British, Lloyd’s List
Each circle is proportionate in size to the number of ships sailing between Britain and the given port
in the years 1802 and 1809. The former is the last year of peace and relatively free trade between
Britain and the Continent, 1809 is a year during the Continental Blockade. Panel B shows the name
of the main ports which the British used as smuggling centres during the Blockade: Gothenburg, ,
Gibraltar and Malta. Data are from the Lloyds List.
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(a) British shipping with Northern Europe
(b) British shipping with Southern Europe
(c) British shipping with France
Figure 6: British shipping with European regions as share of total, 1787-1814 (Lloyd’s
List)
Figure 6 shows time series evidence on shipping between Britain and a given region as a share of total
European shipping with Britain in order to understand regional variation in the effectiveness of the
Blockade. For each year, the shares across the three subfigures add up to 1. The first grey line denotes
the onset of the Napoleonic Wars in 1803, the second grey line indicates the onset of the Napoleonic
Blockade in 1806 and the third grey line indicates the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1813. Data from
Lloyd’s List.
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(a) Exports of British merchandise and other produce
(b) Exports of British cotton cloth and cotton yarn
Figure 7: British exports, thousands of pounds
Panel A gives total value of exports (ex-cluding re-exports) to North-Western and Southern markets.
The former comprises of Russia, Sweden, Denmark and Norway, Prussia, Germany (including ), Hol-
land, Belgium and France, the latter comprises Portugal, Madeira and Azores, Spain, The Canary
Islands and Baleares, Gibrlatar, Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, Malta and the Turkish Empire. Panel B gives
total value of cotton cloth and cotton yarn exports. Data source: Crouzet (1987).
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Figure 8: Traffic up-river and down-river from Strasbourg
Quantity transported up- and down-river along the Rhine from Strasbourg. Consistent with South-
North smuggling, down-river transportation along the Rhine increased during the Napoleonic Blockade.
Down-river transport was constant. Data source: Ellis (1981).
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(a) Shortest route algorithm (Measure 1)
(b) Weighted distance (Measure 2)
Figure 9: Two measures of the trade cost shock
Measure 1 uses a shortest route algorithm to calculate the trade cost shock for each department.
Measure 2 calculates the trade cost shock in the following way. Pre-war distance is simple Euclidean
distance to London. Distance to Britain during the wars is calculated as the weighted Euclidean
distance between each department and smuggling centres. Smuggling centres are identified as ports
to which shipping increased during the wars and where shipping exceeded 80 yearly shipments. The
weights are the share of a given smuggling centre in total smuggling. The log-difference between the
two gives the shock. See text for details.
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(a) Size of cotton industry pc, 1789 (b) Capital pc in mechanised spinning, 1803
(c) Capital pc in mechanised spinning, 1812 (d) Output pc in mechanised spinning, 1840
Figure 10: Evolution of the location of cotton spinning within the borders of ancien
regime France, 1789-1840
The figure tracks the spatial distribution of the cotton spinning industry over time. Circles are pro-
portionate within, but not across panels. The first row follows the evolution of cotton spinning up to
the start of the Napoleonic Wars. In Panel A, each circle is proportionate to the size of the cotton
industry at the departmental level, normalised by population. The data are from Daudin (2010). The
localised nature of the production process implies that this is a good measure of where traditional
cotton handspinning was located. Panel B depicts spindles per capita in 1803, before the Napoleonic
Wars, Panel C shows the same for 1812, towards the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Data source: See
appendix C. Panel D shows the value of output per capita in cotton spinning in 1840 in francs. Data
source: Chanut et al. (2000)
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(a) Number of spindles per capita by department, 1803
(b) Number of spindles per capita by department, 1812
Figure 11: Variation used: short-run regressions
Each circle gives the number of spindles per thousand inhabitants by department at the beginning
(1803) and towards the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1812) for the French Empire. Data sources are
discussed in Appendix C.
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(a) Mechanised cotton spinning
(b) Woollen spinning
(c) Leather tanning
Figure 12: Change in production capacity vs trade cost shock
Each scatterplot depicts change in production capacity per thousand inhabitants vs. the log trade
cost shock measured as the change in effective distance between the department and London (measure
1). Mechanised cotton spinning production capacity measured as spindles per thousand inhabitants.
Woollen spinning production capacity measured as labour employed in woollen spinning per thousand
inhabitants. Leather tanning production capacity measured as tanning pits per thousand inhabitants.
For data sources, see Appendix C.
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(a) Levantine cotton (b) Brazilian cotton
(c) Colonial cotton (d) US cotton
Figure 13: Price of raw cotton in northern and southern regions of the French Empire
Prices are from “Journal du Commerce”. Prices are given in francs per kilogramme for a given day
in a given city for a given variety. Within each category of cotton, the exact variety of cotton was
matched for a southern and northern location within a short interval of time (within a few days to
within a month) for the best comparability possible. Northern cities are: Anvers, Lille, Rouen, Paris,
Havre or Gand. Southern cities are Bordeaux, Marseille, Toulouse, Lyon and Bayonne. For Levantine
cotton, it was possible to match Marseille to a northern city for each year. See Appendix C for a more
detailed description of the data.
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(a) Proximity to coal (b) Access to fast-flowing streams
(c) Weaving frames per capita (d) Population density
Figure 14: Spatial distribution of potential confounders
Access to coal uses the Fernihough-O’Rourke (2014) dataset. To calculate the departmental datapoint
I use the minimum distance to any of Europe’s major coalfields from the capital of each department.
Where data for the capital is not available, I use the closest city from the dataset. This distance is
transformed into a proximity measure using the authors’ measure. The mean flow rates across the
French Empire are calculated using the average monthly flow-rate (m3/s) for each station across the
historical boundaries of the French Empire. The mean for each department is then calculated, and
the natural log of this mean gives the mean-flow rate for each department. Results are robust to
assigning zeros for the mean flow rates in departments with no observations, or assigning a missing
value. Weaving frames measure the size of the downstream sector at its 1803 level (pre-Napoleonic
Wars). Population density is the number of inhabitants per square kilometre according to departmental
population in 1811. See Appendix C for details.
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(a) Date of annexation to French Empire (b) Literacy rate, 1789
Figure 15: Spatial distribution of potential confounders
Panel A shows the spatial distribution of annexation to the French Empire, which is used to measure
institutional change. For departments of ancien regime France, the date is taken to be 1789. Literacy
data is only available for departments of ancien regime France. It is measured as the proportion of
males able to sign their wedding certificate. See Appendix C for details and data sources.
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Figure 16: Change in log capital-labour ratio in mechanised spinning vs trade cost
shock
Change in capital-labour ratio is the log change in the ratio of spindles to workers between 1803-12.
The trade cost shock is calculated based on the shortest route algorithm (measure 1). The estimated
elasticity is -0.09, (se: 0.24).
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(a) French exports of cotton goods, 1798-1828
(b) French exports of cotton goods, 1850-1880
Figure 17: French exports of cotton goods, millions of 1820 francs
Panel A displays the time series of French exports of cotton goods in millions of 1820 francs for
the period 1800-1828. Panel B displays the same for the period 1850-1880. The grey line in Panel B
indicates the signing of the Cobden-Chevalier treaty which dramatically reduced tariffs between Britain
and France. Note that the source for the tade statistics in the two periods are not the same. Wholesale
price deflator from Mitchell (2007). See Appendix C for data sources and variable definitions.
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Figure 18: Raw cotton usage per capita
Imports of raw cotton per capita for the period 1830-1850. Imports of raw cotton measure the size
of the domestic cotton spinning industry as this is the key input used in the production. There is no
other use for raw cotton besides as an input in cotton spinning. Data source: Mitchell (2007).
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(a) Raw cotton usage per capita, 1830-1850
(b) Raw cotton usage per capita, 1890-1910
Figure 19: Importance of cotton for early and late industrialisers in Europe
The two panels compare the size of the cotton industry in four countries at different points in time
during the 19th century. France and Belgium were early industrialisers, while the Netherlands and
Germany were late industrialisers. Data source: Mitchell (2007).
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C Data Collection
C.1 Variable definitions and sources
This section describes the sources of the data used in the empirical analysis and their
definition.
C.1.1 Shipping between Britain and Continental Europe
Data source: Lloyds List, 1787-1814, digitised by Google, made available by the Hathi
Trust
Each observation is a journey which took place between a port in Britain and a port
in Europe (excluding Ireland and Greenland). See the next section for a description of
the construction of the dataset.
C.1.2 Data on the cotton industry during the Napoleonic period
Data source: Champagny’s survey: AN/F12/1562-1564, “Enquetes industrielles” 1810-
1818: AN/F12/1570-1590, AN/F12/1602
The following section contains a detailed description of this data source. Here I only
list the variables used in the empirical analysis and their definition.
• Spinning capacity
The baseline measure of spinning capacity is the number of spindles per thousand
inhabitants in 1803 and 1812.
• Labour employed in mechanised spinning:
Labour employed in mechanised spinning (per thousand inhabitants) for 1803 and
1812 is used to conduct robustness checks. Spindles is the preferred measure of
production capacity in mechanised cotton spinning as mechanisation substituted
for labour. Using labour will therefore underestimate growth in the sector. It is
also more sensitive to measurement error from misclassified handspinning.
• Type of machine used
Table 11 contains results on differential changes in the type of machine used within
a department. The dataset differentiates between two machines used for weaving
weft and warp.65
65Results are robust to classifying “jeanettes” as mule jennys, or dropping them from the estimation
(see the following section for a discussion on type of machines).
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• Downstream weaving capacity
Initial weaving capacity is measured using the number of weaving frames by de-
partment (per thousand inhabitants) in 1803.
C.1.3 Woollen spinning
Data source: 1792: AN/F12/1344-1348, 1810: AN/F12/1602
The size of the woollen spinning industry in each department is measured as labour
employed in woollen spinning per thousand inhabitants. The absence of mechanisation
makes this the relevant measure of woollen spinning activity.
C.1.4 Tanneries
Data source: 1792: AN/F12/1467-1472, 1811: AN/F12/1590-1600
Capacity in tanning is measured as the number of pits per thousand inhabitants.
C.1.5 Literacy rates
Data source: Furet and Ozouf (1982)
Literacy rates are calculated from departmental statistics which give the percentage of
males who can sign their marriage certificate between 1786-1790. The variable takes
on values between 0 and 1.
C.1.6 Conscription rates
Data source: Hargenvilliers (1937)
Departmental conscription rates are defined as the number of men conscripted during
the year 13 according to the French republican calendar (September 1, 1804 - August
30, 1805) divided by total departmental population in 1811. This is the last year
for which detailed departmental statistics are available. Conscription was supposed
to be perfectly proportionate to population across departments. In reality however,
conscription rates differed somewhat. According to Forrest (1989), conscription rates
had significant persistence over time. Departments in which fulfilling previous quotas
had been easier were pushed harder in the following years. By 1813, this was something
that even the “Directeur general de la Conscription” admitted, when he informed the
prefect in Foix that the ability of an area to produce soldiers and past records of
recruitment were being used (Forrest, 1987 p. 41). For this reason, conscription prior
to our period of interest should be a reasonable proxy for differences in labour supply
shocks owing to differential conscription during the Napoleonic Wars.
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C.1.7 Access to coal
Data source: Fernihough and O’Rourke (2014)
For each city in their dataset, the authors calculate minimum distance (km) from any
of Europe’s major coalfields using Chatel and Dollfus (1931) for data on the location
of coalfields. Cities located within a coalfield are coded as having distance 1km. The
authors then transform this into a proximity measure by taking the inverse of this
measure. To normalise the distribution, they multiply the inverse distance by 10,000
and take the natural logarithm. I transform this into a departmental measure for
proximity to coal, by using the datapoint for the prefecture of the department. In a
few cases when data for this city is not available, I use the closest city. I also calculate
a different measure which takes the mean across all cities for which data is available in
a department with very similar results.
C.1.8 Access to fast-flowing streams
Data source: European Water Archive, EURO-FRIEND River Discharge Data
Data on monthly mean flow rates for 2412 collection points across the historical bound-
aries of the French Empire were averaged across time to obtain the mean monthly flow
rate for each collection point. The average mean flow rate in each department is the
average of all collection points located within the department. In the specifications pre-
sented in the paper, I report results which use the natural logarithm of the mean flow
rate, but results are similar when levels are used. Median flow rates across collection
points for each department also give similar results.
C.1.9 Institutional change
Data source: Wikipedia
Institutional change is defined as the date of incorporation into the French Empire for
each department. Departments belonging to France proper are coded as 1789.
C.1.10 Historic location of the cotton industry
Data source: Daudin (2010)
Historic location of the cotton industry is measured using the Tableaux du Maximum,
compiled at the arrondissement (district) level during the French Revolution. The
Tableaux give information on trade links between 552 districts in France for fifteen
different goods categories. Daudin collected a representative sample of arrondissements
across departments in ancien regime France. A binary variable indicates whether a
given consuming district reported consuming cotton goods from a given supplier district.
Given this information, I construct a measure of how many other districts were supplied
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by districts in a given department. Normalising by departmental population gives a
comparable measure of the size of the cotton industry for each department. A nice
feature of this measure is it captures cotton manufacturing for trade rather than own-
consumption. Note however, that it is not a measure of spinning alone, but rather all
aspects of the production process (spinning, weaving, printing).
C.1.11 Raw cotton prices
Data source: Journal du Commerce
Daily raw cotton prices were sporadically reported for various cities during my period
of interest in the Journal du Commerce, the French commercial newspaper of the time.
Within each category of cotton by supplying region (Levant, US, Colonial, Brazilian),
the exact variety of cotton was matched for a southern and northern city within a short
interval of time (within a few days to within a month) in order to attain as close a
comparison between the north and south of France as possible. Northern cities used:
Anvers, Lille, Rouen, Paris, Havre or Gand. Southern cities used: Bordeaux, Marseille,
Toulouse, Lyon and Bayonne. For Levantine cotton, it was possible to match Marseille
to a northern city for each year. These data were supplemented with London prices for
Brazilian cotton from Tooke (1848).
C.1.12 Departmental population
Data source: Chabert (1951)
Departmental population is used to normalise measures of production capacity in cot-
ton and woollen spinning and leather tanning. Population data is available for each
department for 1811, including departments annexed to the Empire during the French
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. In 1806, Corsica was formed of two departments,
Golo and Liamone, which were later merged and called Corse. As population data is
reported for Corse in 1811, I combined the two departments in 1806 and use this in the
analysis.
C.1.13 Data on the cotton industry in the 1840s
Data source: Chanut et al. (2000)
The first industrial census in France was conducted between 1839-1847. Data is missing
for firms in Paris and Lyon and for this reason, the departments Seine and Rhone (to
which the respective cities belonged to) are excluded from the persistence regressions.
I use data on all firms classified as cotton spinning firms. I use the following variables:
value of production, share of women employed, share of children employed, an indicator
variable for whether the firm uses water or steam power and the log of primary materials
used as a measure of firm size. Labour productivity is measured as the log of the value
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of production per employee.
C.1.14 French exports and imports
Data source: F/12/251
Value of exports and imports by category and source-destination country for 1787-1828
( 1790-1797 and 1806 missing). All values in francs.66 I supplment this with data on
the value of British cotton exports and exchange rates from Mitchell (1971).
C.1.15 Consumption of raw cotton per capita
Data source: Mitchell (2007)
I use data on imports of raw cotton and normalise by population as of 1840 to calculate
the size of the cotton spinning industry (for which raw cotton is an imported input)
across Continental European countries for 1830-1850.
C.2 Construction of data from primary sources
C.2.1 Cotton industry: 1803-1812
Data on the cotton industry comes from large scale industrial surveys conducted in
1806 and on a quarterly basis between 1810-1815. The 1806 industrial census contains
almost complete firm level data on all mechanised cotton spinning firms in regions
which were part of the French Empire as of January 1, 1806.67 The quarterly reports,
by department, from 1810 onwards contain data only at the level of the department,
which implies that the unit of observation in the empirical analysis is the department.
Of the 110 departments which formed the French Empire in 1806, data for both 1803
and 1812 is available for 88 departments. In the following, I discuss construction of the
database for each period.
Champagny’s survey of the cotton industry: 1806
In January, 1806 (about 9 months before the onset of the Continental Blockade), the
Minister of the Interior, Champagny set about conducting an industrial census of the
cotton industry. The questionnaire, an example of which can be seen in Appendix D,
66Data kindly shared by Guillaume Daudin.
67Chassagne (1976) gives the historical background to the survey. Chassagne also collected and
analysed the data, but as spindle data was not available by department for 1803 and 1806, only a
qualitative comparison is made between the location of mechanised spinning activity between 1806
and 1812. Detailed data collected by Chassagne was, to the best of my knowledge, never published,
and for this reason, I transcribed all prefectural reports from original sources.
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was sent to the prefects of all departments for completion. 8 of the 110 departments
failed to complete the survey. Data on the precise location of the firm, the name of the
owner, date of foundation, number of employees, (for both 1803 and 1806) number of
different types of machines (for both 1803 and 1806), output and quality of yarn spun
(count variable) were provided. Of the 626 entries from the 102 departments which
supplied data, I eliminated 43 entries which are not firms.68 These entries are either
charitable institutions or jails which produce some cotton yarn for their own use, or
they are entries for rural spinners who use a small jenny instead of a wheel. I drop
the former type of entries, as these are not organised as for profit institutions. Rural
spinners who generally worked in their own homes for a piece rate, are an intermediate
step between traditional, rural handspinning and modern, mechanised firms employing
wage-labourers in a factory. This is not the type of firm the survey asked for, and for
this reason reporting was inconsistent across regions which is why I drop these from
the analysis.
The only other change I make to the raw data is to create a third category for
type of machine. The survey asks the number of “mull-jennys” (MJ - French name
for mule jenny), for spinning weft, and “filature continus” (FC), for spinning warp.69
Firms and prefects would often report “jeanettes” (JEA) which were much smaller,
hand-powered, early type jennys, under the category of MJ. I therefore create a third
category of machine to account for these. The average number of spindles a JEA has
(37) is far smaller than the average number of spindles for am MJ (112) in the sample.
As I impute average spindle by machines type for firms, it is important to make this
distinction.
Imputation model for spindles in 1803 and 1806
Despite the fact that only number of machines were asked for in Champagny’s survey,
some firms or departments reported only number of spindles, some reported both num-
ber of machines and number of spindles and some reported only number of machines.
Because of the different availability of data on capital across firms, and, because sub-
sequent surveys consistently report spindles at the departmental level, it is necessary
to impute spindles for the firms who are missing spindle data in 1803 and 1806. As
the number of machines is known for these firms, once the average number of spindles
by machine, for each firm is imputed, it is possible to calculate the total number of
spindles both at the firm and at the departmental level.
I imputed the average number of spindles by machine type for each firm and then
aggregate these results up to the departmental level. I check robustness of the esti-
mation results to the imputation model in two ways. First, I use multiple imputation
(MI) to impute the data for firms. Differently to single imputation methods, multiple
68Note that this is not equal to the number of firms in the dataset in 1806, because some entries
contain data for firms alive in 1803 which went bankrupt by 1806.
69The two types of yarn differ in fineness.
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imputation does not treat imputed observations as known in the analysis. Instead, MI
creates multiple imputations for each missing observation, and accounts for sampling
variability due to the missing data. This procedure has been shown to be statistically
valid from both a Bayesian and a frequentist point of view (Rubin, 2004). I show that
both the point estimate and the standard errors change very little when this sampling
variability is accounted for. Second, in Section 6 I show that the results are similar
when the number of workers employed in cotton yarn spinning is used as the depen-
dent variable. As this variable is available for almost all firms in 1803 and 1806, and
departments in later surveys, this is not imputation-dependent.70
As the most detailed information is available for firms in 1806, I impute the average
number of spindles for a given machine for a given firm for the data available in 1806
and then use average spindles from 1806 together with number of machines reported in
1803 to impute spindles in 1803 for the firms where this is missing. Of the 567 firms
alive in 1806, 41 reported only spindles. As the number of their machines is missing,
they need to be excluded from the imputation model and their data will simply be
included when calculating total spindles by department. One firm reported neither
number of machines, nor number of spindles, but only the average number of spindles
per machine, so their machine data will be imputed.
The remaining 525 firms all report machine data and some of them also report
number of spindles. These are thus the firms that are included in the imputation model.
Table 14 contains the pattern of missing data for firms in 1806 for the three different
types of machines used by spinning firms, “jeanettes” (JEA), “filatures continus” (FC),
and “mull-jennys” (MJ). Firms usually use only one or two types of machines, which is
why the total number of firms who report using a given type of machine is well below
525. As can be seen from the table, average number of spindles per firm (by machine
type) is missing for around 50% of the firms. Furthermore, in this particular case,
imputation occurs at the level of the firm for a variable that has a restricted range
(average spindle for each machine type varies based on a few varieties available). As
we are interested in spindles by department, aggregating up to the departmental level
should average out non-systematic variability in imputation making the results less
sensitive to sampling variability.
Imputation proceeds as follows.71 By machine type, I calculate average spindles
per firm for the firms which report both spindles and number of machines. I then
use this information, together with data on all other firm characteristics to impute the
average spindle per firm for the given machine type. A further complication arises
70In this sense, it may not be obvious why labour is not the baseline measure of capacity. The reason
for this is that if capital substitutes for labour in the mechanised production process of spinning, then
looking at changes in labour employed will underestimate growth in the sector. Furthermore, data
on number of employees is more susceptible to measurement error because of fluctuations in capacity
utilisation, and it may also contain data from hand-spinning in later years, when the absence of firm-
level data makes this more difficult to detect.
71I use Stata’s multiple imputation tool to estimate the model.
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Table 14: Missing data pattern for average
spindles by machine at the firm level
JEA FC MJ
Spindles and Machine 20 76 102
Machine only 70 136 190
Total 90 212 292
from the fact that other firm level variables are also incomplete. Table 15 contains
the information on missing data patterns for all other firm level variables. As can
be seen, the ratio of missing to complete observations is much smaller in the case of
these variables. However, the fact that all variables contain missing observations in
a non-monotone manner implies that imputation is based on a chain iterative model.
Each variable is estimated using a univariate imputation model with all variables used
as independent variables. Iteration is required to account for the possible dependence
of estimated model parameters on imputed values. I use date of foundation, output,
maximum quality of yarn spun, minimum quality yarn spun, number of workers and
number of each type of machine used to impute the average number of spindles an MJ,
FC and JEA type of machine has in a given firm.
Almost all firm level variables are count variables, therefore a Poisson model is used
for all variables except the three average spindle variables. For these, I use predictive
mean matching to account for the fact that average spindles for a machine is bounded
by technological constraints. In particular, each machine type had a a number of
“varieties” available on the market. For example, MJs usually had 48, 96, 128, 196,
218 and sometime 248 spindles. As the histogram for the average number of MJs per
firm shows in Figure 20, there is a lot of mass at these points of the distribution.72 The
variable is continuous, because some firms use a combination of different varieties, and
averaging at the firm level will give mass to other points.
Table 15: Missing data pattern for firm level
variables
Observed Missing Total
Foundation 560 7 567
Workers 546 21 567
Max quality 401 166 567
Output 522 45 567
Spindles for firm i in 1806 are then simply calculated as the sum of the number of
machines multiplied by average spindles by each type of machine. Calculating spindles
72The figure contains data only for the firms where this information is observed.
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Figure 20: Average spindles per firm for mule-jennys
for firms in 1803 is also straightforward. There are 375 firms in the database, 16 of
which go bankrupt between 1803 and 1806. For almost all the remaining firms, the
average spindle data per machine type can be used to calculate number of spindles in
1803, based on how many machines the firm reported for that year. This clearly does
not work for firms that went bankrupt by 1806, but also firms which switched into new
types of machines between the two points in time. For these firms, I simply use average
number of spindles across all firms for the given machine type. This should not matter,
as there are only 18 such changes across all firms and machine types. Finally, three
departments (Seine Inferieure, Indre et Loire and Orne) do not report 1803 data. For
these departments (which do supply data for 1806), I take the 1806 numbers for the
firms alive in 1803 as the best available measure of spinning activity.
Table 16 compares the coefficients and standard errors for the baseline regressions
using m = 5 and m = 50 imputations. As is evident, neither the point estimates, nor
the standard errors are sensitive to inreasing the number of imputations.
“Enquettes Industrielles”
Data on spinning is only observed at the departmental level from 1810 onwards. Prefects
were asked to initially send reports on industrial activity for various branches of industry
including cotton at 6 month intervals between 1810/1 and 1811/2. From the beginning
of 1812, the reports were to be sent to Paris on a quarterly basis. I observe number of
spindles, number of workers and output at the departmental level. The reports were
intended to inform the government in Paris about fluctuations in industrial activity
and for this reason, prefects sometimes reported capacity and sometimes they reported
utilisation. Therefore, there are sometimes large fluctuations in the numbers reported
from one period to the next. To gain the best possible measure of capacity, I utilise
the reports in the following way. In general, I take data from the year 1812 as this is
the year closest to the end of the Blockade where data coverage was still sufficiently
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Table 16: Robustness to multiple imputation
(1) (2)
Spindles per thous inhabs m = 5 imputations m = 50 imputations
Trade cost shock 33.09*** 33.24***
(9.780) (9.758)
Time FE Yes Yes
Departmental FE Yes Yes
Observations 176 176
Number of dept 88 88
Notes: The table examines robustness to multiple imputation. Depvar is spindles per
thousand inhabitants across all columns, Column (1) estimates the baseline specifica-
tion for m = 5 imputations, Col (2)replicates the regressions for m = 50 imputations.
Robust standard errors clustered at the departmental level in parentheses, *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
large.73 However, if the number of spindles was larger in earlier reports (1810-11), I use
these years. In accompanying qualitative reports sent to Paris, prefects usually indicate
whether firms have gone bankrupt or whether they are idle for cyclical reasons. I don’t
use earlier numbers in instances where it is clear that activity in 1812 is lower because
firms have gone bankrupt.
C.2.2 Woollen spinning and leather tanning
To construct data on capacity in woollen spinning and leather tanning, I use data col-
lected at the ‘arrondissement’ (district - below the department) level for both industries
in 1792 and data collected at the departmental level in 1810 for woollen spinning and
1811 for leather tanning. Data from 1792 is aggregated up to the departmental level
to gain a comparable measure of capacity. The data from 1792 is somewhat noisily
measured as data is collected at the level of the district, and it is often impossible to
determine whether a district’s datapoint is missing or zero. Furthermore, the survey
asks for the state of the industry in 1789, before the Revolution. The survey only covers
departments belonging to France at the time of its 1789 borders.
73As Napoleon’s power unravelled, and troops invaded the territory of France, fewer and fewer
departments submitted their reports.
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C.2.3 Shipping routes between Britain and and Continental Europe
Shipping data was extracted using all editions of the Lloyd’s List between 1787-1814.
The Lloyd’s List, one of the world’s oldest newspapers, was set up by Lloyd’s Coffee
House in London as a meeting point for underwriters of marine insurance. The under-
writers needed up to date news on shipping conditions, and for a small subscription fee
Lloyd’s provided what was generally acknowledged to be the most up to date shipping
bulletin of the time.
Lloyd’s hired paid correspondents in each port to send information on ships arriving
to or departing from a given port to the Post Master General with the word “Lloyds”
written in the corner. Each edition featured news on ships sailing from and arriving
to various ports. The coverage on arrival and departure of ships to all ports in Britain
is believed to be a fairly reliable and representative source of information at the time
(Wright and Fayle, 1927).
Editions of the Lloyd’s List have been digitised by Google. To extract data from this
source, I used an OCR programme to convert the images into machine-readable format
and then used a text-matching programme that searched for the names of European
ports in the Lloyd’s List. As port names have changed over time, and even within the
time frame that I examine, numerous port names or spelling was in use for the same port,
the names of ports were collected by manually searching through editions of Lloyd’s
Lists. There are multiple sources of measurement error inherent in this procedure. First,
the OCR and text-matching programme introduce measurement error both in the form
of matching mistakes and omitted names (the ones that could not be matched, or the
European ports which I did not identify as such). By comparing samples to the original,
I found that incorrectly matched names were minimal, and that the procedure picked
up about 70-80% of the ports depending on the quality of the image. Finally, I also
had one year (1808) manually entered in order to check that the sample with which I
work is representative. There are around 3000 observations for each year.
One potential problem with this data source is that some authors claim that during
the blockade, parts of the Lloyd’s List was censored to protect smugglers and full
information was only provided to insurers at the “Books and Notice Boards in the
Subscribers’ Rooms” (Wright and Fayle, 1927). Censoring would have effected direct
routes between Britain and France where ships were at risk of violating the laws of
the Continental Blockade, but not routes via smuggling centres which either belonged
to the British, or were allied to the British. Censoring would undoubtedly lead to
measurement error in quantifying trade routes, however, there are a number of reasons
to believe that the extent of censoring was not quantitatively important.
First, censoring was only in place for part of the Blockade period, and uncensored
and censored years show a very similar pattern calling into question the extent to
which censoring was indeed practiced. Second, in response to censoring by Lloyd’s, a
rival newspaper was actually set up by employees of the Post Office. This newspaper,
“General Shipping Commerce List” was supposedly not censoring shipping news, which
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would have given Lloyd’s a disadvantage on the market were it to have been extensively
censoring news. Second, the findings from the Lloyd’s List are consistent with both
historical evidence and other sources of quantitative evidence (British trade statistics).
To the extent that direct smuggling to France and Germany was actually possible, the
finding that indirect routes were used to a large extent points to either direct smuggling
not being quantitatively important, or to the fact that direct smuggling was so risky
(and thus costly) that indirect, and less risky routes were equally profitable. As I final
robustness check, I construct two measures of the trade cost shock, only one of which
relies quantitatively on results from the Lloyd’s List.
C.3 Primary sources consulted
C.3.1 Archives Nationales (France)
AN/IV/1318 Petition from cotton spinners to Napoleon requesting ban on imports
of British yarn
AN/IV/1060-61 Ministerial reports on commerce and industry
AN/F7/3040 Daily price for merchandise (including raw cotton) at the Paris exchange
(an 6 - an 10)
AN/F7/8777-8778 Reports on smuggling from Pyrenees and Eastern border.
AN/F12/1554-5 Reports on industry. Includes monthly reports from the cotton
market in Rouen.
AN/F12/533 Diverse documents on cotton industry from Napoleonic period. Con-
tains some prices for spun yarn in Eure department. “Bulletin de coton” giving quali-
tative overview of the state of the cotton industry for a given month (many missing).
Firm level data for mechanised spinners in Seine department for 1808.
AN/F12/631 Daily price for merchandise (including raw cotton) at the Paris exchange
(1806-1813). Qualitative departmental reports on state of industry.
AN/F12/1245B Annual reports from Beaucaire fair (an 6 - 1814).
AN/F12/1342 Tolozan’s report on the state of the cotton industry in 1789.
AN/F12/1344-1348 Industrial survey of woollen industry (1792).
AN/F12/1467-1472 Industrial survey of leather tanning (1792).
AN/F12/1561 Statistics on cotton industry (predominantly for the period after 1810)
AN/F12/1562-1564 Champagny’s survey of the cotton industry (1806)
AN/F12/1570-1589 Detailed departmental statistics and reports for textile industry,
1810-1823.
AN/F12/1590-1600 Industrial survey for leather tanning, 1811
AN/F12/1602 Aggregate tables for textile industry from industrial surveys (cotton,
wool, linen, silk and hemp).
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F12/1859 French consular reports from across Europe. Cotton yarn prices in Bosnia
and Malta.
C.3.2 Bibliotheque National de France (France)
Journal du Commerce Commercial newspaper which sporadically reports prices from
exchanges across France. Contains raw cotton prices from across the French Empire
for 1798-1815.
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D Examples of the Data
Figure 21: Example of prefectural report from 1806 for Escaut department
Figure 22: Example of Lloyd’s List
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